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The U.S. intervention in El Salvador had a number of unintended consequences, 
some negative and some positive, that still have a great impact on the U.S., El Salvador, 
and the international community as a whole today. Although the focus of the mass media 
is on the negative unintended consequences, the positive really outweigh the negative. 
These so-called unintended consequences began with a massive increase in immigration 
to escape the violent human rights violations and political persecutions of El Salvador’s 
Civil War. This migration to the U.S. in the 1980s is referred to as the Salvadoran 
Diaspora, which led to an increasing number of activist community organizations 
founded to help these Salvadoran refugees, even though U.S. policy would not recognize 
migrants arriving from El Salvador as such. These organizations were largely led by 
Salvadoran and Latin American immigrants who had arrived in the U.S. during the 
Salvadoran Diaspora and were all, for the most part, located within the communities in 
which the migrants were arriving, in this case Los Angeles, and settling in. This cycle of 
unintended consequences and reactions would change alongside the needs of the 
Salvadoran communities following the end of El Salvador’s Civil War with the 
implementation of the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords in order to increase focus on 
helping the Salvadoran community gain legal residency status. Additionally, new activist 
community organizations were created to focus on continued legal representation and 
advocacy, access to education, and the maintenance and growth of a transnational 
Salvadoran identity through the promotion of a shared memory of the Salvadoran Civil 
War and the Salvadoran Diaspora. Therefore, in order to adequately explore the 
relationship between the U.S. and El Salvador, an emphasis must be placed on both the 
 v 
positive and negative unintended consequences of intervention, including, but not limited 
to, the Salvadoran Diaspora, the creation of a distinctly Salvadoran transnational 




The history of the United States contains a series of complicated international 
relationships and controversial foreign policy positions, as well as a number of political 
scandals and debates that have captivated the attention of the American public. However, 
due partially to the explosion of social media platforms and twenty-four-hour news 
cycles, none have been as pervasive as the presidential campaign, and subsequent 
election, of Donald Trump. So far, Trumps presidency can be characterized, as comedian 
John Mulaney put it, as if “there is a horse loose in a hospital…it’s never happened 
before, no one knows what the horse is going to do next, least of all the horse – he’s 
never been in a hospital before!”1 One aspect of Trump’s foreign policy, and immigration 
policy, that has garnered particular attention and outrage, for good reason, has been his 
stance on topics surrounding immigration and Central America. The debates that emerged 
in American society following the November 2016 election of Trump were not new in 
any way, but the significant level of attention given to Central America, and El Salvador 
in particular, in the eyes of the American public and international community drastically 
resurged.   
Largely due to the widespread misinformation regarding the historical 
background of this migration pattern, the lasting effects of the role of United States 
foreign policy and intervention in Central America, and the constant barrage of negative 
depictions of Central Americans by the mass media, this increased focus has been 
polluted by inaccurate and negative alternative histories to fit the official narrative of 
                                                          
1 John Mulaney, “John Mulaney: Kid Gorgeous at Radio City,” directed by Alex Timbers, May 1, 2018, 
Netflix video, 44:34-50-58.  
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Trump and his supporters. Additionally, the rise and intersecting of xenophobia, 
nativism, and patriotism within the United States over the past few years has led to a 
polarized anti-immigrant American public that has disproportionately impacted Central 
Americans within the United States. Although this conglomeration of xenophobic, 
nativist, and anti-immigrant rhetoric characterized by Trump’s classic rallying cry of 
“Build a Wall” is not historically new, nor is it unique to the United States, its present 
version is dangerous and has the potential to have even more detrimental international 
consequences than what has already happened. There are a variety of reasons as to why 
these particular debates on topics surrounding the historically-intertwined relationship 
between the United States and Central America, specifically El Salvador, and the pattern 
of immigration from Central America to the United States had not previously pervaded 
the collective American public’s consciousness despite the existence of similar political 
debates for years prior to Trump’s election. Firstly, the uniquely Trumpian brand of 
polarizing and incendiary rhetoric based on incomplete, or entirely inaccurate, claims are 
unique at the very least in the modern age of social media. In other words, “when a horse 
is loose in a hospital, you’ve got to stay updated,”2 and, due to the number of biased news 
media reports on complicated and deeply historically-based sociopolitical debates 
constantly available to the public through their fingertips, a majority of the American 
public is misinformed or unaware of the inaccuracies propelling Trumpian rhetoric 
forward.  
Therefore, providing a more complete historical background that does not dwell 
solely on the negative and actually mentions the positive is necessary to combat the 
                                                          
2 Mulaney, “Kid Gorgeous.”  
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further growth of the anti-immigrant and anti-Central American sentiment that is rooted 
in the underlying partial and negative narrative. For this reason, this thesis seeks to 
historically contextualize one of the largest contemporary debates plaguing both the 
United States and the international community as a whole through a more complete 
analysis of the entangled relationship of the United States and El Salvador since the Cold 
War. It will also discuss both the positive and negative unintended consequences of the 
U.S. intervention in the Cold War-era Salvadoran Civil War, the subsequent Salvadoran 
Diaspora to urban centers of the United States, specifically Los Angeles, and the long-
lasting consequences of this relationship from the onset to the present.  
Although the Cold War, and the U.S. interventions in countless nations perceived 
as going “red,” has been extensively covered by historians, the historiography focused 
specifically on the U.S. role in the Salvadoran Civil War has been comparatively limited 
up until recent years. Additionally, even though El Salvador did gain a place in the 
national consciousness of the American public, as well as the international community as 
a whole, in the later period of the Salvadoran Civil War and immediately following the 
end of the Salvadoran Civil War with the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords due to the 
increase in attention to the pattern of human rights violations occurring inside El 
Salvador from 1980 to 1992, this attention quickly shifted back away from El Salvador 
after the Salvadoran “fifteen minutes of fame” had ended. This comparatively small 
historiography related to, and public knowledge on, the Salvadoran Civil War and the 
subsequent increased relationship between the United States and El Salvador can partially 
be accounted for because of the relatively recent, and still incomplete, declassification of 
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Department of State and other official U.S. government documents detailing the role 
played by the U.S. and the ongoing human rights violations in El Salvador.  
Additionally, many of the contemporary histories of U.S. immigration studies, 
foreign policy studies, and U.S. Cold War-era interventions focus exclusively on the 
negative unintended consequences regarding U.S. action, or inaction, regarding said 
topics. In recent years, starting largely in the late 1990s and accelerating in the 2000s, 
many disciplines outside of history, including political science, sociology, anthropology, 
psychology, and many others, have attempted to address this gap by moving away from 
analyses focused on traditional Cold War political histories to more social and 
transnational accounts. Recently and fairly limitedly, historians have reflected this 
academic shift regarding El Salvador, even just in comparison to the significantly larger 
focus on Nicaragua’s similar historic experiences. Therefore, by focusing more on a 
combination of the “positive” unintended consequences, the political, social, and 
economic impacts of U.S. intervention, and a more social historical approach to a 
traditionally political history topic, this history functions as an attempt to bridge the gap. 
It is important to note that by referring to the unintended consequences largely focused on 
throughout the next three chapters as “positive,” I am by no means attempting to 
trivialize the very real violence, political persecution, and trauma faced and endured by 
the Salvadoran people throughout and following El Salvador’s Civil War. In referring to 
unintended consequences like the foundation of activist community organizations, a 
transnational Salvadoran identity, and a thriving Salvadoran community within Los 
Angeles as “positive,” I only intend to emphasize the under-mentioned ability of the 
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Salvadoran community to make the best out of a terrible situation and ongoing 
sociopolitical exclusion.   
Although the topics covered throughout the following three chapters are fairly 
expansive and are able to provide a comprehensive history of the unintended 
consequences of U.S. intervention in El Salvador, as well as the necessary information 
required to contextualize many of the contemporary foreign policy and immigration 
debates, the focus of this thesis does leave room for future scholarly exploration into 
related topics. Topics for future research include, but are not limited to, how the activist 
community organizations were funded, the demographic makeup of the activist 
community organizations, other similar organizations outside of the six focused on, the 
physical process of immigration during the Salvadoran Diaspora, and a more in-depth 
analysis than done here of El Salvador’s sociopolitical and economic structures, the 
groups that made up the umbrella organization of the FMLN, and further instances of 
both negative and positive unintended consequences from 1980 to the present. As 
previously stated, part of this limitation was due to the limited accessibility of documents 
from Salvadoran sources, information from and on the roles played by other activist 
community organizations, and the delayed declassification process concerning U.S. 
government documents from around the mid-1990s and on. That being said, one 
historiographical contribution of this thesis is the extensive use of primary source 
documents from the United States government on the intervention in and the relationship 
with El Salvador that were found, researched, and incorporated into this thesis from 
personal archival research done in the National Archives at College Park, the National 
Archives in D.C., and the Library of Congress. Additionally, much of the information 
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included on the activist community organizations came out of interviews conducted 
personally with members of said organizations. The inclusion of findings from both the 
archival research and the interviews alone add to the existing historiography and the 
arguments made through an analysis of said sources, especially in conjunction with more 
widely used or referenced primary and secondary source material, allowed for this thesis 
to make a new contribution to the existing historiography.  
The U.S. intervention in El Salvador began in the 1930s with economic 
motivations, as did many of the U.S. Latin American interventions, which would lead to 
an increased economic inequality that would cause an undue strain on the wellbeing of 
the working peasant class. The peasantry rebelled, and the Salvadoran government and 
military forces brutally responded in a violent and indiscriminate repression known as La 
Matanza. This set a violent and memorable standard for the general Salvadoran public 
and contributed to the Salvadoran government’s all-encompassing power to deter future 
uprisings despite the continued and growing inequality and dissatisfaction of the 
Salvadoran public. Therefore, due to this standard set by the government’s violent 
reaction, there was a fear within El Salvador of rebelling that persisted over the next few 
decades up until the years prior to the start of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980. 
Additionally, U.S. influence in El Salvador shifted from solely economic to social and 
political following the start of the Cold War and the success of the Cuban Revolution.  
However, in the 1980s, the umbrella organization Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front, or the FMLN, would unite a wide range of guerrilla and revolutionary 
forces within and would initiate El Salvador’s Civil War. This Civil War was 
characterized by indiscriminate government repression and state-sponsored military 
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violence and persecution similar to that of La Matanza. However, the main difference 
between La Matanza and the Salvadoran Civil War was that the Salvadoran government 
and military had a much greater reach and ability to combat the revolutionary FMLN 
because of backing and financial support from the U.S. government. This U.S. 
intervention greatly contributed to the extended conflict and violence of El Salvador’s 
Civil War, which lasted twelve years, and in furthering the Salvadoran government’s 
goals of eliminating the revolutionary FMLN and reinforcing the legitimacy of the 
existing government and institutional structures that were beneficial to U.S. economic, 
social, and political interests in El Salvador.  
The U.S. intervention in El Salvador had a number of unintended consequences, 
some negative and some positive, that still have a great impact on the U.S., El Salvador, 
and the international community as a whole today. Although the focus is on these 
negative unintended consequences, the positive really outweigh the negative. These so-
called unintended consequences began with a massive increase in immigration to escape 
the violent human rights violations and political persecutions of El Salvador’s Civil War 
from El Salvador to the United States in the 1980s under what is referred to as the 
Salvadoran Diaspora. This increased migration led to an increasing number of activist 
community organizations focused on helping these Salvadoran refugees, even though 
U.S. policy would not recognize migrants arriving from El Salvador as such. These 
organizations were largely led by Salvadoran and Latin American immigrants who had 
arrived in the U.S. during the Salvadoran Diaspora due to the violence created by the 
U.S.-backed regime and were all, for the most part, located within the communities in 
which the migrants were arriving, in this case Los Angeles, and settling in.  
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This cycle of unintended consequences and reactions would change alongside the 
changing needs of the Salvadoran communities following the end of El Salvador’s Civil 
War with the implementation of the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords in order to increase 
focus on helping the Salvadoran community that had arrived during the Salvadoran 
Diaspora gain legal residency status. As the needs of the community evolved, more 
activist community organizations were created with programs that focused on continued 
legal representation and advocacy, access to education, and the maintenance and growth 
of a transnational Salvadoran identity through the promotion of a shared memory of the 
Salvadoran Civil War and the Salvadoran Diaspora. However, the negative unintended 
consequences of gang creation in the U.S. and the increasingly strict U.S. criminal, 
deportation, and immigration and refugee policies that evolved alongside these positive 
unintended consequences would have a negative impact on both the Salvadoran state and 
the Los Angeles-based Salvadoran community. This evolving nature of the U.S.-
Salvadoran relationship ultimately contributed to a “new” Salvadoran Diaspora that 
sparked a resurgence of attention on El Salvador and, more broadly, Central America as a 
whole and renewed focus on contemporary debates concerning U.S. immigration and 
foreign policy. Therefore, in order to adequately and accurately explore the relationship 
between the United States and El Salvador, an emphasis must be placed on both the 
positive and negative unintended consequences of the Cold War-era intervention, 
including, but not limited to, the Salvadoran Diaspora, the creation of a distinctly 
Salvadoran transnational community and identity in Los Angeles, the establishment of 
activist community organizations, and the greater impacts of the Salvadoran-American 
community’s conceptualization as El Salvador’s “Departamento 15.”   
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In order to best articulate these deeply complex and interconnected arguments, 
these next three chapters progress in a relatively chronological structure. Chapter One 
provides a majority of the historical background to the beginning of El Salvador’s Civil 
War and the theoretical definitions necessary to understanding the following arguments. 
Chapter Two deals largely with the period containing a bulk of the actual conflict of the 
Salvadoran Civil War, the start of the Salvadoran Diaspora in the 1980s, and the initial 
stages of community building within Los Angeles. Additionally, Chapter Two introduces 
the first three activist community organizations that played a significant role in the 
Salvadoran community within Los Angeles during the Civil War. Chapter Three builds 
on the roles of the initial activist community organizations from Chapter Two, as well as 
the foundation of other activist community organizations within Los Angeles during the 
negotiations of and following the ratification of the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords. It 
is in this context that Chapter Three makes arguments on the evolving needs of the 
individuals within the Salvadoran community in Los Angeles and the simultaneous 
changing of the activist community organizations to accommodate and best serve the 
needs of the community. Finally, the Conclusion continues the contemporary connections 
begun in the Introduction and further extends the argument as to why, in the current 
sociopolitical climate, a more complete and source-based historical analysis of the U.S. 
relationship with El Salvador is vital for both policymakers and the American and 
international public’s understanding of the underlying roots of immigration and foreign 




Chapter One: Political Violence and the U.S. Role in El Salvador Prior to the Civil 
War 
In January 1981, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 
launched their first “Final Offensive” against the Salvadoran government. This marked 
the official beginning of the brutal twelve-year Civil War in El Salvador. However, the 
roots of this conflict and the contributing causal factors are rooted much deeper in the 
history of El Salvador. Since the 1930s, economic inequality, military control of the 
government, and a pattern of human rights violations and state-sanctioned repressive 
violence has defined the Salvadoran socio-political landscape. However, throughout this 
fifty-year period, domestic efforts at reform, the gradual revolutionizing of key figures in 
the Salvadoran Civil War, and international intervention and influence in El Salvador 
grew and laid the foundation for the creation of the FMLN and the beginning of El 
Salvador’s insurgent Civil War. Therefore, the root causes of El Salvador’s Civil War can 
be broadly broken up into three periods, defined by the 1932 Matanza, the start of the 
Alliance for Progress in the 1960s, and the buildup to the unification of multiple 
insurgent groups under the FMLN umbrella organization through the 1970s up until 
October 1980. Salvadoran history asks us to question typical Cold War chronologies 
because it shows how communism played a role in Salvadoran-U.S. relations in the 
aftermath of the Russian Revolution (1917) and global depression of 1929.  
 Much of the preexisting historiography on El Salvador’s Civil War places it as a 
case study of the larger global Cold War. Both internal and external factors have shaped 
El Salvador’s conflict. Internally, El Salvador’s dramatically uneven economy was 
upheld by a small ruling class, leaving a majority of the population out of the economic 
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and political system. One of the most influential domestic structural problems plaguing 
El Salvador was that of the unified power held by the economic elites and the military 
over key economic, social, and political institutions. This power-based partnership began 
around the 1880s during the “golden age of coffee” and would persist, in one form or 
another, until 1979. Externally, the United States supported the Salvadoran oligarchy on 
the basis that they were anti-communist and protected U.S. economic interests. The Cold 
War politics of the region changed dramatically with the successful Cuban Revolution 
that took place 90 miles off the coast of Florida. Twenty years later, the successful 
Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua also dramatically shaped El Salvador’s geopolitical 
landscape.3  
Historical Background  
The period from 1880 to the Great Depression was considered the “golden age of 
the coffee elite” in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. According to historian 
Jeffery Paige, “coffee and power have been closely linked in Central America since the 
nineteenth century.”4 As small El Salvador became an increasingly large player in the 
global coffee trade, it became more and more reliant on the export of the single product 
of coffee than other nations like Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In order to increase 
production of this export commodity, the coffee elites engaged in land speculation to 
concentrate their ownership over the previously communal agricultural land. Increased 
economic pressure led small peasant farmers, many of whom were Indians, to sell their 
land to the prosperous coffee estates. This led to an increase in available rural agricultural 
                                                          
3 Jeffery M. Paige, Coffee and Power: Revolution and the Rise of Democracy in Central America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 3-34.  
4 Paige, Coffee and Power, 3.  
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workers who ultimately received smaller and smaller wages due to the overabundance of 
labor.5  
The coffee elite survived the challenge to their power and continued to control El 
Salvador’s economy, despite a downturn in their power during the depression. 
Oppositional movements in the late 1920s and early 1930s did reduce the coffee elites’ 
direct political power and made it apparent that the coffee oligarchy would no longer be 
able to maintain complete social, economic, and political control on its own. This led to 
an alliance of convenience, rather than of ideological compatibility, between the 
economically powerful coffee elite and the newly politically powerful military 
dictatorships. Despite the negative experience in El Salvador prompted by the global 
Great Depression, the coffee elite “did not question the logic of the system of export 
agriculture on which the coffee republic had rested.”6 The sharing of power between the 
coffee elite and the military dictatorships allowed the former to avoid any economic 
reforms that might have helped Salvadoran society as a whole, but would have come at 
the expense of the coffee oligarchy. Ultimately, in the period following 1932 through 
1979, the year of Nicaragua’s socialist revolution, the alliance between the coffee 
oligarchy and the military dictatorships continued, and the Salvadoran “coffee elites 
traded the right to rule with the right to make money.”7 Therefore, the lack of structural 
reform that would correct social, political, and, in particular, economic inequities during 
                                                          
5 Erik Ching, Stories of Civil War in El Salvador: A Battle Over Memory (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 2016), 26; Paige, Coffee and Power, 22; Diana Villiers Negroponte, Seeking Peace in 
El Salvador: The Struggle to Reconstruct a Nation at the End of the Cold War (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 17-21.  
6 Enrique A. Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1982), 14.  
7 Paige, Coffee and Power, 22.  
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the 1930s contributed greatly to creating the inequality in Salvadoran society that would 
persist and expand in the period leading up to the Salvadoran Civil War.  
 This new power structure in El Salvador became increasingly evident with the 
start of the sixteen-year authoritarian, repressive, and extremely violent rule of General 
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez in 1931. It was the military-backed dictatorship of 
Hernández Martínez that set in place the ongoing pattern of coups and military juntas that 
would define the next fifty years of Salvadoran politics. Hernández Martínez came to 
power less than nine months following what is widely accepted as El Salvador’s first free 
and fair democratic presidential election in 1931 that resulted with the victory of Arturo 
Araujo. Araujo ran on a platform similar to that of the British Labour Party and was a 
reform-minded landowner who “promised economic and social reforms.”8 Although the 
presidential race was close, the election was ultimately called in favor of Arturo Araujo 
who became president and installed Hernández Martínez as vice president. As president, 
Araujo attempted to make good on the promises of reform he made during the campaign. 
Araujo decided that, in order to attempt to soften the impact of the Great Depression on 
the Salvadoran working class, he would pass tax reforms and reduce the military’s 
budget. The military did not like that their perceived power was being challenged by 
Araujo’s proposed reforms and military budget cuts. Attempting a reform that the 
military perceived to be a challenge to their power, proved to be the crucial mistake that 
ultimately put the final nail in the coffin of Araujo’s presidency. In December of 1931, 
after only being president for nine months, a military officer-led coup overthrew Araujo’s 
                                                          
8 Ching, Stories of Civil War in El Salvador, 29.  
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democratically elected government and began the military dictatorship led by General 
Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.9  
La Matanza  
Although the Matanza in January of 1932 would ultimately become famous for 
the sheer level of violence and state-sponsored murder and repression, before the 
Matanza, peasant uprisings  were recurrent features in El Salvador throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries because “peasants had a long history of resorting to 
violence when they believed all other avenues to achieving their goals had been closed to 
them.”10 However, in suppressing and responding previous similar uprisings, the 
Salvadoran government did not come anywhere close to the level of mass slaughter as 
that in January 1932. There are many different competing and complementary 
interpretation as to why the 1932 Matanza turned into such an extremely large-scale 
massacre, but many of the dominant explanations include an anti-communism sentiment 
as playing a major role in El Salvador’s Matanza. Additionally, immediately following 
the Matanza, the state’s political violence against the peasant rebellion was justified as a 
means of preventing the spread of communism in El Salvador and the United States did 
not condemn the violence of the Salvadoran state because of its anti-communist stance. 
Therefore, the 1932 Matanza, although long before the U.S. anti-communist Cold War 
                                                          
9 Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company), 72; Baloyra, El Salvador in Transition, 1-17; Paige, Coffee and Power, 22, 99; Héctor Lindo-
Fuentes, Erik Ching, and Rafael A. Lara-Martínez, Remembering a Massacre in El Salvador: The 
Insurrection of 1932, Roque Dalton, and the Politics of Historical Memory (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2007), 1-2, 24-27.  
10 Lindo-Fuentes, Ching, and Lara-Martínez, Remembering a Massacre in El Salvador, 61.  
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stance, helped set the precedent for U.S. foreign policy and hemispheric relations with 
Latin America throughout the Cold War.  
In late January 1932, the combination of an increasingly exploitative economic 
system based on the production and export of coffee, ongoing social tensions, and 
dissatisfaction with the newly established military dictatorship of Hernández Martínez, a 
group of farmers, agricultural workers, and Indians staged a rebellion in western El 
Salvador. Another contributing factor to sparking this 1932 uprising was the notoriously 
high population density within El Salvador. Although the rebellion was distinctly 
centered in the western countryside, this region directly resembled the rest of the country. 
For example, El Salvador was a predominately agricultural nation with an 
“overwhelmingly rural, poor population,” and so “regardless of where people lived 
throughout the country, they tended to reside in rural districts on the outskirts of small 
regional towns.”11 This high population density within El Salvador as a whole was 
especially problematic in western El Salvador, where a large amount of the nation’s 
Indian population resided. The combination of poor peasant farmers and Indians who 
were reliant on the coffee industry and the damage done to this industry in the wake of 
the Great Depression led the already disgruntled western portion of El Salvador to take 
action in the form of an uprising against the institutions of power that they saw as a major 
root cause of the daily problems they were facing.  
The pressures imposed on the peasants by commercial coffee production in the 
western highlands of El Salvador led to the initial peasant revolt. The group of rebels 
                                                          
11 Lindo-Fuentes, Ching, and Lara-Martínez, Remembering a Massacre in El Salvador, 24.  
  
16 
largely directed their attacks at “symbols of local power, such as government buildings, 
businesses, homes, military garrisons, and local Ladino elites.”12 The military’s 
counteroffensive against this rebellion began almost immediately in order to stop the 
rebellion from spreading to the rest of El Salvador and would continue for almost a 
month. During this time, the government and military indiscriminately massacred anyone 
even remotely close to where the uprisings took place. This mass slaughter of Salvadoran 
peasants would, from then on, be known as the Matanza, or massacre. The estimated 
number of people murdered by the state ranges from 8,000 to 30,000, but there is no 
official number because actually counting the number of dead bodies was far too risky for 
anyone to undertake.13  
Although the legacy of the Matanza was important in radicalizing a lot of the key 
figures in El Salvador, events over the next fifty years, particularly following the Cuban 
Revolution and during John F. Kennedy’s presidency, would use and build on this legacy 
to garner more widespread support in El Salvador for another uprising. Immediately 
following the Matanza, communism was recognized as one of the main driving forces 
behind the peasant uprisings by individuals in both in El Salvador and in the United 
States. Additionally, as time went on, the historical memory of the Matanza by 
individuals on both the left and the right increasingly attributed the role of communist 
and anti-communist sentiments to the uprising and the government’s reactionary 
                                                          
12 Lindo-Fuentes, Ching, and Lara-Martínez, Remembering a Massacre in El Salvador, 28.  
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slaughter of between 8,000 and 30,000 peasants. However, those on the left remembered 
the Matanza as “act of heroism by the Communist Party,” while the right “reinterpreted 
1932 as a victory over communist subversion.”14 Despite these conflicting views of the 
Matanza, the fact that multiple different interpretations of the event acknowledge the role 
played by anti-communist sentiment in contributing to the violent and repressive 
response of the Salvadoran government and military to the Matanza provides a fair 
amount of credibility to this argument. Additionally, the political polarization over the 
memory of the Matanza would only grow over the next fifty years, which contributed 
greatly to setting the stage for the beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980.  
The Partido Comunista de El Salvador (PCS), or the Salvadoran Communist 
Party, which was founded in 1930. Additionally, 1930 marked the return of Farabundo 
Martí, a student organizer and member of the Central American Socialist Party, to El 
Salvador. Martí also headed El Salvador’s chapter of Soccorro Rojo Internacional (SRI) 
which, as it described itself in one of its leaflets, was a “vast organization, without party 
affiliation, which accepts the idea of class struggle. It proposes to defend all the workers 
who are persecuted by imperialism, capitalist governments, and all other agencies of 
oppression…proportioning its legal aid and material and moral support to workers and 
their families.”15 Although SRI distinctly stated that they were unaffiliated with any party 
or communist organization, their support for the victims of capitalism was, in the 
atmosphere created by the first Red Scare, enough for them to be demonized in the eyes 
of the anti-communist Salvadoran government.  
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The tensions surrounding the first Red Scare also played a role in how 
international outsiders would interpret, and react to, the Matanza. Only a few days after 
the initial peasant uprising, and long before the amount of reactionary state-sponsored 
violence and mass slaughter was even close to finishing, the New York Times ran an 
article entitled “Red Revolt Sweeps Cities in Salvador.” In this article, William J. 
McCafferty, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires in San Salvador, provided information on the 
high level of violence in El Salvador caused by these uprisings, and, in reporting back to 
the State Department, had advocated for the United States to dispatch naval vessels to El 
Salvador in an attempt to “prevent much bloodshed.”16 The article reported that, after this 
initial report of violence in El Salvador’s cities, that the United States Navy, along with 
Great Britain and Canada, sent warships because of the information the State Department 
received from McCafferty. The State Department, through the information released in 
this article, then tried to frame this decision favorably by saying that this action was out 
of concern for the U.S. citizens in El Salvador. The New York Times article then reported 
that, just prior to telephone communications being cut off, McCafferty informed the State 
Department that “serious disorders of a communistic nature had broken out,” and that 
officials were convinced that the uprisings were a result of the “genuine drive of 
Reds…who have been fairly numerous in El Salvador.”17 The use of the U.S. public’s 
fear of communism following the “Red” revolt was successful in framing and justifying 
intervening in El Salvador in 1932, and would somewhat foreshadow how the United 
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States would use the Cold War ideological tensions to justify intervening in El Salvador’s 
Civil War fifty years later. 
Overall, the real level of influence communism and anti-communism played in 
the 1932 peasant uprising and the subsequent Matanza is unknown, but, during the 1920s 
and 1930s, the Salvadoran government did establish a pattern of using anti-communist 
sentiment to justify the repression of dissident workers. However, “many Salvadorans 
considered communism to be only one of many factors shaping their society,” and often 
cited concern about “ethnic conflict over land” in the years leading up to and following 
the Matanza.18 Despite the presence of economic and ethnic tensions, over time the 
Matanza would increasingly be interpreted as an uprising sparked by the Salvadoran 
Communist Party and brutally shut down by the anti-communist military dictatorship of 
General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez.19  
The violent legacy of the Matanza would continue to grow and influence a rising 
number of Salvadoran individuals and groups to begin thinking about the need for 
structural reform that would ultimately result in the Salvadoran Civil War. However, it 
would be far too simplistic to argue that this singular event was what led to the creation 
of the FMLN and the start of the Salvadoran Civil War. Therefore, the Matanza alone did 
not directly lead to the creation of the FMLN or the FMLN launching its first “Final 
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Offensive” in January 1981. However, the legacy of the Salvadoran government’s violent 
and repressive reaction to any potential reform-minded uprising, like that of January 
1932, did set the standard of what would happen if another uprising was attempted 
without the support of the Salvadoran general public and the proper preparation of the 
rebel groups to adequately combat any counterinsurgency launched by the military 
dictatorships. This standard of state-sponsored violence, and the relative ongoing strength 
of the military dictatorships, prevented any real attempt at reform in El Salvador up until 
1979.  
Additionally, although the events of the 1932 Matanza did not directly lead to the 
start of the 1980 Civil War, they did provide a substantial contribution. In the FMLN’s 
report detailing their plans for El Salvador’ “democratic revolutionary victory,” the 
events surrounding the 1932 Matanza were directly referenced. In this document that 
accompanied the insurgent actions of the first “Final Offensive,” the FMLN begins their 
arguments on the issues surrounding the political process in El Salvador by stating that 
“with the uprising of 1932, in which more than 30,000 workers and peasants were 
massacred, the military dictatorship in El Salvador consolidated itself. Since then, the 
political power has been taken over by the Army, alternatively placing military men at 
the head of the government through coups or fraudulent elections.”20 Although this 
document clearly has an underlying political motivation, the argument that the FMLN 
made surrounding the repression and issues with the political process in El Salvador and 
continuing up until 1981, when this was written, is fairly justified. Therefore, although 
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the historical roots of the Salvadoran Civil War cannot solely be traced back to the 1932 
Matanza, it did play a large contributing factor and initiated many of the issues that 
persisted and evolved over the next fifty years. 
Following the Matanza, political life in El Salvador continued to be largely 
characterized by strong military dictatorships monopolizing political power and the elite 
coffee plantation owners monopolizing economic power, which left little to no space for 
any real sociopolitical or socioeconomic reform. However, the social memory of the 
Matanza would contribute to the radicalization of Salvadorans that lived through, or were 
born shortly after, 1932. One of these key emerging revolutionary figures was Roque 
Dalton, who was born in 1935. Roque Dalton was a prominent Salvadoran poet and 
author that identified as a Marxist and would wind up becoming one of the political 
leaders of the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), which was an important group under 
the umbrella coalition of the FMLN. Roque Dalton’s father, Winnall, was a member of 
the Dalton Brothers Gang, who were outlaws that gained an infamous reputation by 
robbing banks in the United States. After completing a large heist in Kansas City, 
Winnall Dalton fled to El Salvador. While in El Salvador, Winnall Dalton invested in 
coffee plantations and had a child with María García, a Salvadoran nurse. Because of his 
father’s fortune, Roque Dalton was able to attend a number of Jesuit schools in El 
Salvador but was alienated from his classmates due to his mother’s social class 
background.21  
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After he spent his childhood witnessing firsthand the deeply divided social classes 
in El Salvador, Roque Dalton went to Chile to study law. Winnall Dalton had apparently 
hoped that by sending Roque to Jesuit schools that he would become more conservative. 
However, that backfired terribly, and it was in the university that Roque Dalton became 
increasingly interested in reading Hegel, Marx, and Lenin, as well as others, and 
solidified his knowledge of socialists texts that would “later develop into solidly Marxist 
positions.”22 In 1966, Roque Dalton attended a meeting of the International Communist 
Party in Russia and, prior to returning to Cuba and then to El Salvador, Dalton spent 
some time in Prague. It was in Prague that Roque Dalton met Miguel Mármol, who 
would also become a key figure of the Salvadoran revolution.23 It was Dalton’s 
conversations with Mármol and his writing on Mármol’s experiences during the Matanza 
that initially solidified Dalton’s status as a revolutionary figure in El Salvador.  
Mármol was one of the founding members of the Salvadoran Communist Party in 
1930 and one of the few individuals who survived the mass slaughter in the 1932 
Matanza, even after being arrested under the suspicion that he was one of the communists 
who organized the uprising. After being arrested, Mármol was taken, along with eighteen 
other prisoners, to a large ditch to be executed by a firing squad. Mármol was shot four 
times, “but he survived, largely because so much blood had been spilled on him that as a 
police officer was preparing to deliver the coup de grâce a superior told him not to waste 
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the bullet.”24 While the two men were in Prague, Miguel Mármol told Roque Dalton his 
life story in a series of interviews that Dalton would eventually turn into a book entitled 
Miguel Mármol: Los Sucesos de 1932 en El Salvador, or Miguel Mármol: The Events of 
1932 in El Salvador. It was in this book that Dalton cemented his own role as a key 
revolutionary literary figure, and, through the context of Mármol’s life, analyzed the 
events of 1932, the regime of Hernández Martínez, and the roles played by U.S. 
intervention and imperialism.25 
Roque Dalton was a key figure in the Salvadoran revolution both as an 
intellectual leader and a militaristic guerrilla figure. Even while fighting in the ERP, 
Dalton continued to write extensive amounts of poetry and prose advocating for the 
ideals of revolution that he had become a crucial player in. Additionally, Dalton played a 
huge role in influencing his fellow countrymen in moving towards a revolution through 
his poetry’s focus on the polarization of Salvadoran society, as well as the deeply 
problematic structural issues within El Salvador, that stemmed from the Matanza’s 
impact on Salvadoran society. In this way, Roque Dalton’s role in shaping the ideology 
of the revolutionary groups that would make up the FMLN was a prime example of the 
significant impact that the Matanza, as well as the international atmosphere of revolution 
within Latin America, had on the ultimate beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War.26  
Continued State-Sponsored Repression and U.S. Intervention in the 1960s  
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The next major period of attempted reform through insurgency, with immediate 
repressive counterinsurgent backlash from the Salvadoran military dictatorships in power, 
was the late 1950s leading into the early 1960s and John F. Kennedy’s assumption of the 
U.S. presidency. The attempts of revolutionaries here are no longer best described as 
peasant uprisings, or the small-scale uprisings focused more on local reform that occurred 
in January 1932 and resulted in the Matanza. Instead, it was during this time period that 
revolutionary groups in El Salvador used insurgency methods that would become the 
foundation for the tactics taken by the FMLN during the Civil War. An insurgency can be 
loosely defined as “an organized attempt to overthrow a central government or state by 
subversion or by force of arms.”27 The pattern of repressive violence that the Salvadoran 
military dictatorships had continued since the Matanza, therefore, was engaging in 
counterinsurgency in an attempt to maintain the status quo.28 A main contributing factor 
as to why the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency strategy was able to be so 
successful during this time period was the intervention and aid from the United States. 
Although the presence of U.S. intervention was felt in El Salvador, and in Latin America 
in general, much earlier than Kennedy’s presidency, it was at this point in time that the 
U.S. policy towards the insurgencies occurring throughout Latin America shifted through 
the implementation of the Alliance for Progress. Additionally, it was under Kennedy that 
the official Cold War anti-communism strategy “became one of not only 
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counterinsurgency, but also support for democracy” through the use of “modernization 
theory.”  
The adaptation of traditional Cold War strategies of the United States to fit the 
Central American context changed over time but, by the time of the start of El Salvador’s 
Civil War in 1980, the use of rhetoric detailing the need for the prevention of the spread 
of communism was prominent. In El Salvador, the United States’ Cold War strategy was 
based in part on “modernization theory,” which combined the traditional elements of 
counterinsurgency through military and economic aid with the promotion of democracy, 
economic growth, and security. Modernization theory countered dependency theory 
which had advocated that Latin American underdevelopment was a result of global 
development where resources flow from a “periphery” of poor and underdeveloped states 
to a “core” of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. 
Modernization theory, under the Kennedy administration, advocated that “to ensure 
protection from both internal and external subversion, states needed capable militaries 
and police forces, and the United States could and should assist anticommunist 
governments to arm and train their security forces.”29  Although this counterinsurgency 
approach was adapted gradually over time, by the time that the Salvadoran Civil War was 
in full swing, the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush approached 
Cold War foreign policy regarding Central America had clearly developed from 
Kennedy’s implementation of policies based on modernization theory. The Reagan 
administration put great emphasis on the provision of support to ideologically 
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compatible, although sometimes highly oppressive, regimes like the Salvadoran junta in 
order to contain the perceived Soviet incursion and power in Central America.30  
One way that the Kennedy administration pursued modernization theory in El 
Salvador was through the beginning of the Alliance for Progress. Although many public 
justifications were given by the Kennedy administration for instituting this “benevolent” 
and aid-oriented program, part of the underlying motivation for Kennedy to pursue the 
promotion of internal order in El Salvador, and Latin America in general, was to avoid 
the possibility of “another Cuba.”31 In implementing the Alliance for Progress, 
“economic development” became one of two main facets because “its logic held that new 
government opportunities for the poor would reduce social grievances and the appeal of 
calls for revolutionary change…and it was thought that economic growth would create an 
expanding middle class, which was seen as the bastion of liberal democratic values.”32 
The second facet of the Alliance for Progress was closely intertwined with that of 
economic development, and it relied on U.S. military aid programs that would 
“professionalize” the Salvadoran military in order to prepare it “to combat Castro-style 
guerrillas.”33 This professionalization of the Salvadoran Armed Forces was seen largely 
as a preventative step to ensure the protection of the new economic development 
programs.34  
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Ultimately, the Kennedy administration, as well as the following presidential 
administrations leading up to the start of El Salvador’s  
Civil War, saw the Alliance for Progress as a means to prevent revolutionary insurgency. 
However, the prevention of insurgency through the Alliance for Progress would 
ultimately fail because of internal forces within El Salvador’s provocation of the 
Salvadoran Civil War. Even though the exacerbation of existing internal strife during the 
1960s and into the 1970s built largely off of the same structural issues of the Matanza, 
the preventative counterinsurgency preparation of the Salvadoran military by the United 
States would just exacerbate the violence leading up to and including the start of the 
twelve-year Civil War.35   
Over the next few years, the Alliance for Progress programs that were intended to 
decrease the need for a revolutionary insurgency in El Salvador became increasingly less 
and less effective. By the late 1960s and into the 1970s, the attempt to placate the call for 
reform through “economic development” failed because it did not address the structural 
problem with El Salvador’s economy: the continued control by a few economic elites of 
an export-crop economy. Ultimately, the worsening economic conditions “forced the 
majority of the population into an untenable and deteriorating economic situation by the 
late 1970s.”36 Additionally, because the military dictatorship political structure did not 
allow for any space in which the peasantry could participate and institute potential 
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reforms, the potential to inspire change through democratic means seemed impossible 
and many believed that an insurgent revolution was the only option left. Throughout the 
1970s, an increasing amount of revolutionary groups had emerged and grown in 
prominence throughout El Salvador’s society. However, it was not until 1979-1980 that 
the unification of these opposition groups, and the creation of the FMLN, that this idea of 
a revolutionary insurgency would change into a real possibility.  
The Creation and Rise of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front  
The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front was symbolically named after 
Farabundo Martí, who was captured, tried, and condemned to death for “treason and 
conspiracy” for his role in the peasant uprising of 1932. Martí also founded the Partido 
Comunista de El Salvador, or the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) in 1930, and, 
for this reason, became the “figurehead and martyr of the Salvadoran revolutionary 
movement.”37 All of the guerrilla groups that would eventually combine under the 
umbrella organization of the FMLN in the 1970s can trace their roots back to Communist 
Party of El Salvador (PCS). However, despite ultimately unifying under the FMLN, it is 
important to note that all of these groups maintained their own autonomous and unique 
group identity and leadership. The FMLN was a “front,” which means it was a “coalition 
of various organizations, united for a specific goal and in which each retains its own 
identity.”38 The main components that made up the FMLN were the Popular Liberation 
Forces (FPL), the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP), the National Resistance (RN), the 
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Central American Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRTC), and the Salvadoran Communist 
Party (PCS). The FMLN combined a couple major groups that had been fighting against 
the oppressive Salvadoran government in the mid-1960s. All of the guerrilla and 
revolutionary groups that would eventually combine under the umbrella organization of 
the FMLN in the 1970s can trace their roots back to the Communist Party of El Salvador 
(PCES). One of the most significant of these groups was the People’s Revolutionary 
Army (ERP) which drew much of their ideological and tactical foundations from the 
revolutionary Marxist Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The political faction was led by Roque 
Dalton.39 
These five groups that would ultimately come together in October 1980, although 
all leftist organizations, were far from a heterogeneous group and disagreed on almost 
everything, including the strategy that the FMLN should pursue in its insurgency. 
However, the event that ultimately allowed these individual groups to pursue 
revolutionary change successfully, at least to a degree, was their unification and “its 
ability to present itself to the world as a single entity and subsume the divisive 
factionalism between the groups.”40 Although this unification is largely attributed to the 
perceived need for a revolution, and the recognition that a unified front would have a 
better chance against the U.S.-backed counterinsurgent Salvadoran military forces, the 
international influence and mediation role of Cuba played a significant role in the original 
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process of unification. An additional connection between Cuba and the five revolutionary 
groups that would unify under the FMLN was that in 1961, Dalton was sentenced to 
death for inciting a communist revolution. He fled to Cuba where his personal communist 
ideals were cemented along with his belief in the need for revolution in his homeland. In 
Cuba, Dalton witnessed and took part in the Cuban Revolution, where he learned 
guerrilla tactics and received military training that he would bring with upon his return to 
El Salvador in 1965.41 
In the period leading up to the October 1980 unification of the revolutionary 
groups, Cuba played a large role in mediating the conflicts between the groups and 
ultimately creating the space conducive of unification. As Andrea Oñate pointed out in 
her article entitled “The Red Affair: FMLN-Cuban Relations during the Salvadoran Civil 
War, 1981-1992,” Cuban leadership pointed out three compelling points to the factions of 
Salvadoran revolutionary groups. First, unification of the revolutionary groups would 
make opposing the U.S.-backed Salvadoran military much more feasible, especially 
following the ramp up of repression and violence against insurgencies following the 
success of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua. The second 
decisively compelling argument in favor of unification was an analysis of the path taken 
by the FSLN. Like in El Salvador, the revolutionary insurgent groups in Nicaragua began 
as disunified organizations. However, following the unification of these organizations 
with Cuban support, the FSLN quickly was able to mount an offensive and overthrow 
Nicaragua’s military dictatorship. The third, and final, argument made by the Cuban 
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leadership was by far “the most alluring incentive for unity: extensive Cuban support 
contingent on this unity.”42 The leaders of the individual revolutionary organizations, 
therefore, agreed that a Cuban-backed insurgency would provide them the best chance 
against a U.S.-backed counterinsurgency, and so the groups finally unified under the 
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front.  
Systemic Socioeconomic Inequalities and the Salvadoran Junta  
The systemic socioeconomic inequality in El Salvador was sustained through the 
prevention of land reform by a militarized and authoritarian political system that was 
designed to benefit the small upper class of the agriculture-export industries. Although El 
Salvador relied on multiple various agricultural products to sustain their agricultural-
export economy, after the middle of the nineteenth century, coffee became the most 
important. In order to encourage productivity and increase the export and trade with the 
global community, including the United States, peasant farmers and the middle-class 
were forced by the government to sell their land to the agrarian elites to create more 
prosperous coffee estates. This marginalization of the lower classes by the Salvadoran 
government and the economic elites began a new wave of socioeconomic inequality in El 
Salvador that would continue in one way or another until the Cold War era. Up until the 
late-1970s, when the build up towards a revolution and FMLN-led insurgency was 
apparent, the violence in El Salvador was based on these socioeconomic inequalities. 
This form of violence is referred to as ‘institutionalized violence’ because its purpose was 
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to serve the social, economic, and political institutions that benefitted the economic 
elites.43  
In 1980, the Salvadoran government under the Christian Democratic Party 
proposed a program of agrarian reform that would benefit a majority of the non-
agricultural-elite population and was founded in decades of reform advocacy dating back 
to the nineteenth century that was popular with the lower and middle classes of 
Salvadoran society but was ultimately squashed by the political and economic elites. If 
the agrarian reform was allowed to continue, the socioeconomic status of the coffee elite, 
as well as their control of a significant amount of El Salvador’s land, would be seriously 
threatened. This led the coffee elite, along with their allies in the military and their allies 
in Washington, to start an attempt to block the agrarian reform by any means necessary. 
Because of the large-scale aid of the Salvadoran military, as well as the comparatively 
smaller U.S. aid, the coffee elite were able to overthrow the 1980 government and 
establish a new, agricultural-export elite sympathizing junta`. In turn, this outraged the 
middle-class revolutionaries that made up the FMLN and marked the official beginning 
of the Salvadoran Civil War. Therefore, the argument that scholars, like Diana Villiers 
Negroponte, make through this analytical approach to the Salvadoran revolution and 
Civil War is founded in two contentions that challenge the dominant Cold War battle for 
ideological hegemony and democracy promotion explanation. First, Negroponte contends 
that the internal actors, as opposed to external intervening actors, were the main forces in 
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the Salvadoran Civil War. In addition to recognizing the active role played by Salvadoran 
institutions, more and more scholars like Negroponte are putting a greater focus on the 
role of socioeconomic inequality and various forms of violence prior to and during the 
Salvadoran Civil War in order to show the evolution of violence in the postwar period.44  
With the historic roots of Roque Dalton’s People’s Revolutionary Army and 
continued Cuban support, the consolidation of revolutionaries under the FMLN’s 
umbrella alliance in the period leading up to the Salvadoran Civil War made the reality of 
a successful social revolution in El Salvador appear possible. However, the FMLN 
underestimated the extent to which the United States-backed, Christian Democratic 
Party-run Salvadoran government, or the junta, and their counterinsurgent tactics would 
go to suppress the FMLN’s insurgency.45 The junta sought to “use some combination of 
political, administrative, military, psychological, and civic actions to maintain the status 
quo against an insurgent force that is trying to upend that order.”46 This counterinsurgent 
response of the Salvadoran central government and El Salvador’s Armed Forces against 
the FMLN insurgency was financially and militarily supported greatly by the United 
States and, specifically, the Ronald Reagan administration. Support for the massive level 
of aid provided to the Salvadoran junta was framed through both traditional Cold War 
rhetoric promoting hegemony and, especially in the later years, through the argument that 
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the aid allowed for the nation of El Salvador to move towards better democracy through 
more fair elections, human rights protections, and a professional military.47 
The adaptation of traditional Cold War strategies of the United States to fit the 
Central American context changed over time but, by the time of the start of El Salvador’s 
Civil War in 1980, the use of rhetoric detailing the need for the prevention of the spread 
of communism was prominent. In El Salvador, the United States implemented a form of 
John F. Kennedy’s “modernization through militaries” approach to anticommunism. This 
combined the traditional elements of counterinsurgency through military and economic 
aid with the promotion of democracy, economic growth, and security. This led the 
Kennedy administration, and the following administrations in one form or another, to 
stress that “to ensure protection from both internal and external subversion, states needed 
capable militaries and police forces, and the United States could and should assist 
anticommunist governments to arm and train their security forces.”48  Although this 
counterinsurgency approach was adapted gradually over time, by the time that the 
Salvadoran Civil War was in full swing, the administrations of Ronald Reagan and 
George H.W. Bush approached Cold War foreign policy regarding Central America 
under a clear influence of Kennedy’s modernization theory. The Reagan administration 
put great emphasis on the provision of support to ideologically compatible, although 
sometimes highly oppressive, regimes like the Salvadoran junta in order to contain the 
perceived Soviet incursion and power in Central America.49  
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The United States justified intervention by saying it was a means to promote 
democracy. However, there were also other underlying rationales used while determining 
what the Cold War foreign policy towards El Salvador would be. For example, the 
promotion of democracy and economic reform over the adoption of communism would, 
in the long run, be more favorable to and protective of the US economic interests in El 
Salvador. Ultimately, the full scope of the intervention of the United States in Salvadoran 
affairs, as well as how this intervention was perceived by Salvadoran citizens, is summed 
up in Roque Dalton’s poem entitled “O.E.A.” In this poem, Dalton writes “…Y el 
Presidente de los Estados Unidos es más Presidente de mi país que el Presidente de mi 
país.”50 This translates to say that the “United State’s President’s more my country’s 
President than my country’s President is.” This poem shows how the FMLN and its 
leaders viewed the role of the U.S. and that was as an indirect but powerful neo-colonial 
power. This point of view was justified through the experience of Nicaragua and other 
Central American countries that had gone through similar Cold War-era revolutions and 
faced a state-sponsored counterrevolution supported by the United States.  Although the 
United States did not attempt to directly control the Salvadoran government, the indirect 
hegemonic influence, military training, and financial aid provided by the United States 
allowed for, as Dalton perceives, pseudo-control of the Salvadoran state.    
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Following the beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War, it appeared to the Reagan 
administration and the United States that the American values of democracy and 
anticommunism were in danger due to the FMLN-led insurgency. The U.S. therefore 
justified their intervention in El Salvador, as well as their passive tolerance of the 
countless human rights violations committed by the junta and the military, by arguing 
that the levels of violence would be worse if the FMLN was to rise to power. However, to 
most Salvadorans, the Civil War was not considered to be yet another proxy battlefield 
for determining the ideological supremacy of the Cold War. The Salvadoran Civil War, 
in the eyes of a large amount of the citizenry, was founded in revolting against El 
Salvador’s history of social, economic, and political inequality and the institutionalized 
violence these inequalities brought.51  
Although the FMLN did argue for the overthrow of the junta, the revolution was 
not, as the United States government believed, an attempt to rid El Salvador of 
democracy. Rather, it was the FMLN’s motivations of a reduction in social, economic, 
and political inequality, the marginalization these inequalities caused, and an end to the 
institutionalized violence perpetrated by the governing junta through socioeconomic and 
political reform through the creation of a more reliable democracy to end the agricultural-
elite’s control of El Salvador. In order to rally global support and to clear up any 
misperceptions as to the motivations of the FMLN in the Salvadoran revolution, the 
FMLN issued a document entitled “El Salvador on the Threshold of a Democratic 
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Revolutionary Victory.” In this report, the FMLN laid out a brief history of El Salvador 
as a means of providing background for why the FMLN emerged and what the intended 
principles of reform were to be implemented following the success of the revolution’s 
launch of the “Final Offensive” in January 1981. The “Final Offensive,” as designed by 
the FMLN’s newly untied guerrilla umbrella organization, intended to capitalize on the 
public’s dissatisfaction with the recently failed agrarian reform in order to trigger a 
popular insurrection to overthrow the repressive junta government.  
In “El Salvador on the Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary Victory”, the 
FMLN argues that the history of El Salvador “can be condensed in terms of repression, 
murder, torture, prison, exile, and social marginalization,” and that the junta’s prevention 
of the implementation of the 1980 agrarian reform was the latest iteration of the political 
violence committed against the citizens of El Salvador.52 The FMLN also used this 
document to clarify to the global community that, despite the “distortion” of the conflict 
in the international press, the FMLN was not “a terrorist movement seeking violence for 
violence’s sake.”53 The document went on to specifically call out the role played by the 
United States government as “dangerous and irresponsible” with detrimental 
consequences of the intervention, including the prolonging the conflict unnecessarily and 
the “raising of its cost in terms of human lives.”54 Despite these clarifications and 
explanations of the FMLN’s intended purpose and ultimate goals of revolution, as well as 
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the explicit condemnation of U.S. intervention as a proxy battlefield for the Cold War 
ideological battle, the United States continued, and amplified, aid to the Salvadoran junta 
government and military forces. This caused the so-called “Final Offensive” of 1981 to 
ultimately fail in overthrowing the government, and so the period of massive political 
violence caused by the Salvadoran Civil War continued until 1992.55 
The FMLN’s First “Final Offensive”  
In January of 1981, after only about three months of being a unified revolutionary 
insurgent front, the FMLN launched their first “Final Offensive.” Prior to the actual 
insurgent acts of the “Final Offensive,” the FMLN issued a report entitled “El Salvador 
On the Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary Victory.” In this document, the FMLN 
wrote “a brief report on El Salvador, its political process, human rights violations and the 
war of extermination,”56 starting with the 1932 Matanza. This document was also meant 
to describe the composition of the FMLN straight from the source, and to show “the basic 
principles of the future democratic revolutionary government that we intend to establish 
in the near future.”57 However, because the first “Final Offensive” happened so quickly 
after unification, the revolutionary groups within the FMLN did not yet fully know how 
to effectively work together while mounting a unified insurgency, which was ultimately 
one of the main reasons for the failure of this “Final Offensive.” Additionally, in the 
beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War, many of the revolutionaries believed, due to the 
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recent triumph of the FSLN in Nicaragua, that the insurrection would quickly triumph 
following unification of the FMLN and the launching of the “Final Offensive.” In fact, 
the “Final Offensive” was scheduled to take place so soon after unification so that the 
FMLN “would be able to seize power before the hawkish Reagan administration took 
office a few weeks later.”58 Unfortunately, this backfired and began the violent and 
drawn out twelve-year Civil War.  
Another reason that the first “Final Offensive” failed was that the FMLN 
underestimated the willingness of the U.S. to intervene in internal affairs of their nation 
after the 1979 socialist revolution of Nicaragua. A declassified U.S. Department of State 
Memorandum between Abraham Rodriguez, a former Salvadoran presidential candidate 
from the U.S.-supported Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and U.S. Ambassador to El 
Salvador, Frank J. Devine, documents their conversation about the potentially dangerous 
similarities between Nicaragua and El Salvador. In fact, the memorandum revealed that 
the diplomats feared El Salvador might be “potentially worse than the crisis in Nicaragua 
because unlike Nicaragua where dissent is basically focused on one man and his family 
dynasty, political polarization in El Salvador is based on growing antipathy toward the 
entire civilian/military establishment which has governed the country since 1932.”59 A 
month later, a message to the Assistant Secretary of State was sent that contained 
Ambassador Devine’s further assessment of the situation, and stated that “there is going 
to be political change, probably made more likely by events in Nicaragua.”60 This 
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acknowledgement of the potential for insurgency a whole year and a half prior to the 
FMLN launching their first “Final Offensive” showed that the United States was not only 
worried about the insurgency in El Salvador following the successful path of Nicaragua, 
but that the United States, and their allies in the Salvadoran counterinsurgency 
government and military, had time to, and did, ramp up their counterinsurgent 
preparation to effectively combat insurgency when, not if, it came. Additionally, the 
FMLN underestimated the extent to which the United States-backed, Christian 
Democratic Party-run Salvadoran government, or the junta, and their counterinsurgent 
tactics would go to suppress the FMLN’s insurgency.  
El Salvador’s history has been a complex interweaving of domestic tensions and 
international exasperation of, and intervention because of, said tensions. Starting with the 
1932 Matanza and its reactionary, repressive, and extremely violent government 
massacre of peasant uprisings, the power of El Salvador’s social, economic, and political 
institutions were effectively monopolized through the alliance of the coffee oligarchy and 
military dictatorships. The complete and overarching control that this alliance gave to a 
few powerful individuals, as well as the standard of violence set by the state-sponsored 
Matanza, was maintained up until the start of the twelve-year Salvadoran Civil War in 
1980. In other words, by looking at the gradual radicalizing of individual revolutionaries, 
like Roque Dalton, and the insurgent revolutionary groups that would ultimately make up 
the FMLN, the ongoing legacy of the memory of the 1932 Matanza is apparent. 
Additionally, by analyzing the impact of the Alliance for Progress, and its ultimate failure 
to prevent an insurgent uprising in El Salvador, the evolution of the structural issues 
rooted in the 1932 Matanza, and directly argued against within the FMLN’s justifications 
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for mounting its first “Final Offensive,” shows just how far back into El Salvador’s 
history the issues being fought over in El Salvador’s Civil War went. Finally, although 
the existing domestic economic, social, and political tensions played a large role in the 
buildup to El Salvador’s Civil War, the global context in which these tensions existed 
further exacerbated El Salvador’s domestic political climate to a point that it was 
conducive to the beginning of an insurgency and a large-scale Civil War. The United 
States intervention in El Salvador, driven largely by Cold War-era tensions and the recent 
success of the Nicaraguan insurgency, played an influential role in the effectiveness of 
the Salvadoran government’s counterinsurgency, while the financial aid and influence of 
Cuba provided a necessary incentive for the unification of the insurgent groups under the 
FMLN. However, it was the combination of all of these deeply complex domestic and 
international tensions, actors, and organizations that ultimately led to the beginning of the 




Chapter Two:  Salvadoran Immigration and Responses in the U.S. 
Overall, the period following the initial 1980 beginning of El Salvador’s Civil 
War up until the 1992 Peace Accords was a turbulent time for both Salvadorans in El 
Salvador and the newly transnational communities of Salvadorans in the United States. 
This humanitarian crisis and fairly profound change in immigration patterns from El 
Salvador to the United States began the Salvadoran Diaspora, and this moment in history 
continues to impact legal, social, political, and humanitarian policies, organizations, and 
debates in both the United States and El Salvador presently. Although most of this 
“blowback” from U.S. immigration and refugee policy has been portrayed negatively in 
recent media, especially under the Trump administration and regarding the “Salvadoran” 
gang MS-13, the upsurge in the creation of Salvadoran activist organizations and the 
establishment of transnational communities, like that of MacArthur Park in Los Angeles, 
that revolved around an evolving, yet distinct, Salvadoran identity is proof of a positive 
form of blowback that does not get its due recognition in the mainstream public 
consciousness. This activism of community organizations, like the Los Angeles 
Sanctuary Movement, El Rescate, and CARECEN, combined religious-based 
humanitarianism, preexisting activism that had been persecuted in El Salvador, and the 
few U.S.-based Central American-focused ideals in order to overcome a bias in U.S. 
immigration policy that excluded Salvadorans fleeing persecution from rightfully 
claiming refugee status within the United States. Additionally, although all three 
organizations did make an active attempt in the early years to address the root causes of 
the political violence that led to an increase in Salvadoran refugees, the main focus 
became the Los Angeles communities in which the organizations were located. By 
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focusing on the arrival city of Los Angeles and, more specifically, the MacArthur Park 
neighborhood in which a majority of Salvadoran refugees arrived, settled, and established 
lives in, these activist organizations were able to take the relatively small amounts of 
funding available to them and most efficiently, and directly, provide legal, social, 
political, and humanitarian aid and representation to the Salvadoran communities. Also, 
by creating a welcoming and helpful arrival city in which the refugees were able to set 
down permanent roots, the activist organizations contributed to the creation of a 
community within MacArthur Park that had a common history in and memory of the 
Salvadoran Civil War and El Salvador in general. This allowed the refugees to maintain 
their distinct Salvadoran identity and culture while, at the same time, created a new 
transnational identity and community of Salvadoran-Americans in Los Angeles that 
would continue to grow while still maintaining their connection with their country of 
origin, El Salvador. Therefore, the 1980-1992 was the foundational period for both the 
hyphenated transnational community of Salvadoran-Americans as well as the first 
grouping of major activist organizations focused on Salvadorans in the United States that 
would continue to grow in influence and scope, as well as influence the establishment of 
new, similar organizations, in the years following the 1992 Peace Accords in order to 
address the evolving needs of the Salvadoran-American community.  
Immigration from El Salvador to the United States prior to the 1980s was 
relatively small. The Salvadoran Civil War in 1980 sparked a new pattern of migration 
resulting from Salvadoran civilians fleeing political violence and persecution hoping to 
claim asylum or be given refugee status. This Salvadoran Diaspora continued throughout 
the twelve-year period of El Salvador’s Civil War and contributed to the creation of 
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distinctly Salvadoran communities within urban spaces in the United States, like Los 
Angeles and Washington, D.C. This diaspora also gave rise to activist community 
organizations that advocated for the recognition of the Salvadoran immigrants as refugees 
because this designation would provide a legally recognizable status for the Salvadorans 
arriving in the United States. Additionally, following the implementation of Peace 
Accords by a United Nations-sponsored Truth Commission, these Los Angeles-based 
activist community organizations evolved alongside of the needs of the Salvadoran 
community by shifting their advocacy focus away from recognition of Salvadorans as 
political refugees to the recognition of the members of these established Salvadoran-
American communities as legal permanent residents. Through the activism of these 
community-based organizations, Los Angeles became one of, if not the, primary arrival 
city for Salvadorans fleeing political violence in El Salvador during the 1980s and 1990s, 
which led to the proliferation of said activist community organizations focused on the 
provision of aid to Salvadorans in Los Angeles, a growing Los Angeles-based group of 
Salvadoran activists, and the creation of a transnational Salvadoran identity and 
community.  
Definitions of the Salvadoran Diaspora and Transnationalism61 
Although the term “Salvadoran Diaspora” has been accepted within the academic 
community as a way to describe the pattern of migration out of El Salvador to the United 
States following the beginning of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980, the identification of 
Salvadoran migration to other countries as a diaspora only began in the late 1990s and 
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early 2000s. However, as diaspora is usually understood “as a collectivity of individuals 
who have been displaced from a common origin, and who are now dispersed in a variety 
of locations,” the term fits relatively well with the Salvadoran experience.62 The 
Salvadoran Diaspora, in turn, has led to the transnationalism of the Salvadoran national 
identity. Transnationalism, or “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain 
multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement,” 
is evident in the case of El Salvador and is epitomized through the example of the 
Salvadoran experience in Los Angeles.63 Additionally, although migration from El 
Salvador to the United States had existed, and was likely to continue to exist, prior to the 
Salvadoran Civil War, the drastic increase in the Salvadoran out-migration during the 
Salvadoran Diaspora was heavily influenced by the push factor of the start of the Civil 
War and the subsequent political violence, persecution, and economic instability.64  
Political Violence in El Salvador and the Start of the Salvadoran Diaspora 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the start of the Salvadoran Civil War in 1980 was 
characterized by a still ununified FMLN’s launch of the First “Final Offensive” in 1981, 
the ultimate failure of this “Final Offensive” to achieve any of its stated goals, and the 
overreaction of the Salvadoran junta, or military government, with backing from the 
United States, in suppressing this “leftist uprising.” On December 10, 1981, following the 
failure of the “Final Offensive” to be final, the pattern of political violence that 
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characterized El Salvador’s Civil War begun with a vengeance. The junta had received 
notice of a group of FMLN guerrillas gathering in the eastern province of Morozan, and 
so El Salvador’s Armed Forces were deployed. Upon arriving, the Salvadoran troops did 
not try to distinguish between FMLN insurgents and innocent civilians that lived in the 
Morozan province and “deliberately and systematically executed hundreds of men, 
women, and children.” This massacre of over 200 civilians, of which more than half were 
“children younger than eighteen,” by the Armed Forces of El Salvador became known as 
the El Mozote Massacre.65  
The conversations about the Civil War changed when it was discovered that a 
civilian massacre had taken place and these reports reached the U.S. mainstream press. In 
January 1982, international media attention and news reports on the El Mozote Massacre 
began. Alma Guillermoprieto, a reporter for The Washington Post, published an article, 
“Salvadoran Peasants Describe Mass Killing.” She quotes the Salvadoran Ambassador to 
the U.S., Ernesto Rivas Gallont, who denied that the Armed Forces of El Salvador would 
ever indiscriminately and purposefully massacre women and children. Rivas went on to 
confirm that, yes, there was an offensive in Morozan by the Salvadoran Army in 
December, but that the actions were against the FMLN guerrilla insurgents and 
“definitely not been against the civilian population.” Throughout the rest of the article, 
however, Guillermoprieto reports evidence, and retails stories from survivors who had 
escaped to a guerrilla-protected camp that witnessed the “alleged” massacre. 
Guillermoprieto personally communicated with the FMLN and then traveled to El 
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Salvador’s Morozan province to see for herself if there was evidence of the El Mozote 
Massacre. She wrote about trekking through deserted towns in the Morozan province 
until she finally reached the town of Mozote, which she described as looted, destroyed, 
and smelling of “decomposing bodies.” Guillermoprieto stayed in an FMLN guerrilla 
encampment and, while there, she was able to interview the few refugees staying in the 
guerrilla encampment from Mozote about the violence committed by the Salvadoran 
Army. Following the publication of this article, the Reagan administration, Ambassador 
Rivas, and the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, Deane Hinton, all denied the accuracy of 
Guillermoprieto’s article as well as the accuracy of related news reports.66 
In May 1982, Hinton, who had been the ambassador to El Salvador since 1981 
and was appointed under Ronald Reagan, had still not reached a definite conclusion as to 
the involvement of the Salvadoran Army in the massacre of civilians at El Mozote. 
However, despite not being able to confirm anything, Hinton adamantly argued some 
important points related to the nature of violence in El Salvador. The first, and most 
significant, point Hinton argued in this telegram was that even if there were civilian 
deaths near Mozote, a systemic massacre by the armed forces was simply impossible. 
Secondly, Hinton stated that any possible deaths around El Mozote were not uninvolved 
civilians, but rather were guerrilla collaborators. Finally, Hinton stated that if civilian 
death did occur, it was nowhere near the amount reported by the international press 
because those numbers were inflated by “leftist propaganda.” Hinton’s ultimate message 
in this May 1982 telegram to Reagan administration officials in Washington was that the 
                                                          





political violence within El Salvador, as embodied by the Salvadoran government and 
armed forces, did not target civilians and therefore were not the human rights-violating 
“death squads” described in the international press. Because the United States provided 
funding and military training to the Salvadoran junta and armed forces in order to aid in 
their fight against the FMLN, the desire of the Reagan administration to portray the 
Salvadoran junta and armed forces favorably was high.67  
Following the virtual denial of the El Mozote Massacre by Deane Hinton and by 
senior Reagan administration officials in Washington, news reporters and foreign 
correspondents, like Guillermoprieto, began to disregard the government’s reports on the 
state of political violence in El Salvador. This especially regarded to information related 
to the Salvadoran junta or armed forces due to the underlying motivations of the U.S. 
government to paint a favorable picture of the Salvadoran junta. Following the El Mozote 
Massacre “credibility gap” that came out of the dramatically different stories told by the 
press and by the U.S. government about the same event, journalists and the American 
public began to dismiss the government reports as “propaganda.” 
In late 1982, on the heels of the conflict between the press and the government on 
the “credibility gap” concerning the El Mozote Massacre, Deane Hinton and the 
American Embassy in San Salvador attempted to definitively chart the violence in El 
Salvador over a twelve-month period starting in September 1980 and ending in 
September 1981. This report was titled “A Statistical Framework for Understanding 
Violence in El Salvador.” Within this report, Hinton contended that the need for this 
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statistical framework was due to “the breakdown of the country’s social and political 
systems and the onset of the civil war exacerbated the march toward a society where 
violence is the central factor of daily life.”68 This argument that Salvadoran society was, 
and would continue to be, an inherently violent state would have made sense if the data 
reported by Hinton was viewed in isolation. However, this analysis ignored many key 
outside influences to this period of widespread political violence. For example, this report 
did not attempt to situate the Salvadoran Civil War in the larger context of the Cold War-
era revolutions in Central America or in the context of the Cold War-era U.S. 
intervention, and therefore does not acknowledge the role played by the provision of 
funding by the United States to the Salvadoran government.  
Another problem of Hinton’s report was that the data collected by the Embassy 
relied largely on the reports of political violence and murder in the Salvadoran media. 
Although the Salvadoran media did report on the political violence and murder in in El 
Salvador, the data being reported was very nonspecific and vague. This limited and 
nonspecific data from the Salvadoran media led to increased unreliability in the reports 
founded on this data being analyzed and reported on from the U.S. Embassy in El 
Salvador. This margin of error became even more clear when Hinton compared the 
statistical data compiled by the Embassy to two reports compiled by the Central 
American institutions of the Central American University and the religious institution 
Socorro Jurídico. Both the Central American University and Socorro Jurídico regularly 
kept statistical data on the violence in El Salvador. All three various versions of the 
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existing data on the levels of political violence and murder in El Salvador had their 
individual issues, but the two Central American institutions consistently reported similar 
figures to each other while the figures reported by the Embassy were drastically different. 
For example, during the month of April 1981, the Embassy reported 493 incidents of 
political violence. On the other hand, the Central American University reported 2,341 and 
Socorro Jurídico reported 2,311. The margin of error between the Central American 
University figures and the Socorro Jurídico figures was understandable, but the same 
could not be said for the figures reported by the U.S. Embassy and Deane Hinton. The 
credibility of the amount of political violence reported by Hinton was questionable, 
especially since this report was compiled so soon after Hinton’s inability to confirm or 
deny any real details about the El Mozote Massacre.  
This report on the statistics of violence in El Salvador did, however, contain some 
information that provided insight on the nature of violence in El Salvador’s society. For 
example, this report supported the argument that political violence negatively impacted a 
greater number of Salvadoran youths than any other demographic. In his analysis of the 
data, Hinton stated that it was “without question” that it was the “young who are the 
principal victims here.” This negative impact of the political violence of the Salvadoran 
Civil War on the youth stemmed from the original issues of social, political, and 
economic inequalities, as well as the subsequent marginalization, that the FMLN’s initial 
“Final Offensive” strove to combat in 1981. Due to the twelve-years of intense political 
violence in El Salvador, and the ultimate failure of the revolution, the underlying 
inequalities were never wholly solved – in fact, it is easy to see that they worsened. 
Definitional Differences and the Exclusion of Salvadoran Refugees  
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During the 1980s, the Salvadoran migrants fleeing the aforementioned political 
violence and persecution of El Salvador’s Civil War were seen, under U.S. immigration 
policy, as economic migrants and not political refugees or asylees. Therefore, the U.S. 
government’s position on the Salvadoran migrants, many of whom had entered the 
United States without legal authorization, was that they were “economic immigrants who 
deserved to be deported to El Salvador rather than persecution victims who deserved 
political asylum in the United States.”69 This stance was especially controversial because 
migrants from “unfriendly” Central American nations, like Nicaragua, where the U.S.-
backed regime was not in power, were recognized as refugees. For Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans, who were fleeing nations under the control of U.S.-supported governments, 
it would have been anathema to U.S. policy in the region to declare them as fleeing a 
hostile government. The failure of the U.S. government to provide a legal and accessible 
designation for the Salvadoran migrants fleeing persecution in the 1980s combined with 
increasing political violence there and an increasing number of Salvadoran activists 
seeking refuge in the U.S. led to the initial establishment of community organizations in 
Los Angeles. At first, these focused specifically on providing aid to the growing 
community of Salvadoran refugees. These community organizations began to work in the 
1980s to secure legal protection for Salvadoran and, to a lesser extent, Guatemalan 
refugees. This was largely due to the interest of the Salvadoran activists arriving in Los 
Angeles prioritizing providing aid to their homeland and their fellow Salvadorans 
arriving in Los Angeles. Therefore, according to sociocultural anthropologist Susan 
Bibler Coutin, the early beginnings of many of these community organizations and 
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nonprofits came out of “a solidarity movement composed of religious groups, political 
activists, and legal advocates [that] sought to establish that the United States government 
was discriminating against Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers due to foreign 
policy considerations.”70 Additionally, many of these early manifestations of community 
organizations, nonprofits, and solidarity movements were founded by the educated and 
previously organized Salvadoran activists who had already fled the political violence and 
persecution of El Salvador with the ultimate goal of establishing legalization programs 
for Salvadorans fleeing the war as well as advocated to address one of the main root 
causes of the political violence of the period, the ongoing U.S. military aid to the 
Salvadoran government.71  
During the Civil War, Salvadorans that opposed both sides of the conflict, the 
FMLN and the Salvadoran junta, fled the civil strife within El Salvador to the United 
States, seeking protection through asylum. This pattern of migration that began, grew, 
and remained consistent throughout the early 1980s from El Salvador to the United States 
continued following the official ending of the Cold War, the signing of the Salvadoran 
Peace Accords in 1992, and well into the 2000s and 2010s. Under the 1980 Immigration 
and Nationality Act, political asylum could be granted to migrants that establish a “well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion.”72 This definition adopted by the United 
                                                          
70 Susan Bibler Coutin, “Cause Lawyering and Political Advocacy: Moving Law on Behalf of Central 
American Refugees,” in Cause Lawyers and Social Movements, edited by Austin Sarat (2006): 104.  
71 Coutin, “Cause Lawyering and Political Advocacy,” 101-119; Coutin, “Originary Destinations,” 47-72; 
Baker-Cristales, Salvadoran Migration to Southern California, 17; Norma Chinchilla and Nora Hamilton, 
Seeking Community in a Global City: Guatemalans and Salvadorans in Los Angeles (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2001): 133-134.  
72 Donald Kerwin, “The Faltering US Refugee Protection System: Legal and Policy Responses to Refugees, 
Asylum-Seekers, and Others in Need of Protection,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 31, no. 1 (2012): 3-4.  
  
53 
States was very similar to, and founded in, the definition created by the 1951 United 
Nations Refugee Convention that sought to define and provide new protections for a class 
of migrants fleeing the violence of World War Two. The United Nation’s broad 
definition of “refugee” are “persons who are outside their country of origin for reasons of 
feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that have 
seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection.”73 The 
1951 Refugee Convention details the various conditions under which a person could 
claim refugee status in the eyes of the United Nations but, for the most part, the U.N. 
High Commission on Refugees, or UNHCR, keeps the definition purposefully broad and 
generalized so that it can be easily applicable to future refugee situations, like those of 
Cold War-era Central America and, more specifically, Civil War-era El Salvador.74  
Almost immediately following the U.S. adoption of this definition of refugee and 
asylee, the U.S. role in Cold War Central America entered a newly intense stage. 
Between 1981 and 1990, “almost one million Salvadorans fled repression at home” and 
made the dangerous journey to the United States to seek asylum. However, because of the 
U.S. involvement in the conflict in El Salvador, and the support it pledged for the 
Salvadoran government, the United States government classified these fleeing migrants 
as “economic migrants” that were ineligible for political asylum status. If the United 
States would have granted asylum to individuals fleeing El Salvador, that would imply 
that the United States was acknowledging that the potential Salvadoran asylees were 
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oppressed and, because the United States had an explicit role in supporting the 
Salvadoran junta financially and militarily, it would have been viewed as political suicide 
to label these regimes as oppressive. This was where the acute differences between the 
United Nations and United States definitions of who qualified as a refugee or asylee 
really mattered. For example, while, under the United Nations definition, Salvadorans 
fleeing the political violence and routine pattern of massacre that characterized the early 
Salvadoran Civil War were individuals who “feared persecution, conflict, generalized 
violence, or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order,” the U.S. 
definition was ever-so-slightly different and, therefore, exclusionary towards 
Salvadorans. Rather than just adopting the UNHCR definitions’ “feared persecution,” the 
U.S. definition of refugee included the phrase “well-founded fear of persecution.” This 
small, but significant, change required those fleeing persecution and claiming refugee or 
asylee status to have substantial evidence of state-sponsored repression or violence 
against an “immutable” personal characteristic, like “race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”75 Not only is this “well-
founded fear of persecution” immensely difficult for anyone to obtain whilst fleeing a 
repressive regime, the ability of Salvadoran refugees to show evidence of the Salvadoran 
state’s political violence was made even more difficult due to the active refusal of the 
United States government to acknowledge the repressive role of the U.S.-backed 
Salvadoran government and military, as shown through the vague and inconclusive 
nature of Ambassador Deane Hinton’s reports.76 Therefore, from the beginning, 
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Salvadorans entering the United States during the early 1980s faced huge roadblocks and 
the need for non-governmental assistance and aid for this growing community became 
increasingly clear. This need, in conjunction with the portion of Salvadoran refugees 
already involved in activist networks in El Salvador, led to the rise of Salvadoran-led and 
focused activist groups in the United States dedicated to providing aid to this new 
distinctly Salvadoran community.77  
The United Nations as an outside international perspective on the human rights 
situation in El Salvador was important in the debate over the status of Salvadorans 
arriving in the United States and claiming refugee status. A similar outside contribution 
on the monitoring of human rights violations in El Salvador was made by Amnesty 
International’s annual reports. In these reports, Amnesty International acknowledged the 
wrongdoings of groups on both sides of the Civil War, which was an important outside 
contribution from an international organization in adding to the reports from the United 
States, the United Nations, and El Rescate, which will be mentioned in depth in 
upcoming sections. In the 1985 report, Amnesty International wrote that they “continued 
to be concerned about massive human rights violations, including arbitrary arrest and 
prolonged detention without trial, torture, “disappearances,” and individual and mass 
extrajudicial executions.”78 The report went on to acknowledge the role of the FMLN in 
related human rights violations and persecution, but then emphasized that the 
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overwhelming majority of the human rights violations occurring in El Salvador came 
from either official government forces or “death squads” made up of both military and 
civilian supporters of the Salvadoran junta. This claim was supported by Amnesty 
International’s inclusion of a quote from a 1984 report entitled Extrajudicial Executions 
in El Salvador: Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Examine Post-mortem and 
Investigative Procedures in Political Killings that found “that many of the estimated 
40,000 people killed in political violence in the preceding five years had been murdered 
by government forces who openly dumped mutilated corpses in an apparent effort to 
terrorize the population.”79  
This general sentiment on the human rights violations in El Salvador being 
committed largely by the Salvadoran junta and military in an officially supported 
capacity was continued in the 1987 Amnesty International Report. However, the main 
difference between the 1985 and 1987 reports was that in 1985 the compilation of 
information by Amnesty International workers was relatively unhindered. The amount of 
information contained in the 1987 report and the “collection of human rights abuses,” 
however, “was hindered by a wave of arrests of human rights workers and by interference 
in the work of journalists.”80 This increased repression of human rights workers in El 
Salvador was representative of the increasing levels of violence and persecution of 
individuals and groups outside of those in support of the Salvadoran junta, including the 
FMLN, and echoed the UN’s advocation for the recognition of Salvadorans fleeing a 
“well-founded fear of persecution” as refugees. Additionally, the information compiled in 
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these reports, as well as other Amnesty International reports, spanning the years of the 
Salvadoran Civil War gave further fuel to activism in the United States for the adaptation 
of U.S. refugee and immigration policy to make the official refugee status more inclusive 
of and accessible to those arriving in the U.S. during the Salvadoran Diaspora.  
Salvadoran Activism in the United States  
 The term “activism,” as it is used in this paper, is necessarily broad and 
encompasses a wider range of activist and advocacy-focused individuals and groups. 
Activism, as a form of advocacy, in this context consists of “ongoing efforts, often by 
members of nongovernmental organizations, to influence policy in a particular area.”81 
Additionally, the term “activism,” in the context of this thesis, should not be read with the 
negative connotation typically associated with the term in the United States. In Latin 
America, the word “activism” or “activist” can be used in a more neutral way than the 
militant way that it is traditionally used in the United States. In this case, the policy area 
on which activism is focused is immigration and the rights of refugee and immigrant 
groups in the United States. Additionally, in this context, the terms “activism/activist,” 
“community organizations,” and “nonprofit organizations” are often used 
interchangeably, and usually refer to groups with the same or similar goals. For example, 
a community organization like the ones that will be discussed are often also nonprofits 
that are a group of individuals with the activist goal of providing aid to the U.S.-based 
Salvadoran communities and influencing policy regarding the legal recognition and rights 
of said Salvadoran community.82 For the sake of this paper, the focus will be on the early 
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activist groups that emerged in Los Angeles following the initial start of the Salvadoran 
Diaspora including, but by no means limited to, the Los Angeles Sanctuary Movement, 
El Rescate, and the Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN).83  
The Central American Sanctuary Movement officially began on March 24, 1982 
in Tucson, Arizona under Jim Corbett, a Quaker, and John Fife, a Presbyterian minister, 
when the two were caught illegally escorting undocumented Salvadoran refugees into the 
United States and then threated by INS officials for sheltering these people in churches 
and homes of those who supported the movement.84 The Sanctuary Movement as a social 
movement quickly grew and spread beyond solely Tucson and Catholic religion-based 
sanctuary to other major U.S. cities, like Los Angeles, and other religious institutions, 
such as Jewish synagogues, as well as non-religious institutions such as colleges and 
entire cities, and also grew to provide aid to refugees from Central American nations. 
Additionally, the start date of the Central American Sanctuary Movement – March 24, 
1982 – was symbolically significant to the increasingly transnational Salvadoran identity 
within the United States and the growing Salvadoran communities because it was the 
second anniversary of the politically motivated assassination of the Salvadoran 
archbishop Monsignor Oscar Romero. Msgr. Romero was a saint-like figure in the eyes 
of the Salvadoran community. Additionally, as of October of 2018, Romero has been 
officially recognized by the Catholic Church as a saint, further showing his significance 
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as a martyr for much of Latin America. Therefore, the beginning of the Sanctuary 
Movement occurring on this anniversary carried both real and symbolic weight in the 
eyes of Central American activists.85  
The combination of the beginning of the Sanctuary Movement and the founding 
of activist organizations like El Rescate and CARECEN in Los Angeles at the same time 
led to the full scope of social and political advocacy on behalf of gaining refugee status 
for the community of Salvadoran immigrants. However, it was the Sanctuary 
Movement’s ability to transcend religiously-based humanitarian concerns and lead to the 
beginning of a widespread questioning of the social and political conditions that were the 
root causes of why Salvadoran immigrants indeed qualified for refugee status, and why, 
under U.S. policy, this group was not recognized as such. Even though the Sanctuary 
Movement in Los Angeles was one of many programs that advocated on the behalf of 
Salvadoran refugees, it is widely accepted that it had a profound effect, especially “with 
respect to its most immediate, humanitarian goals” of protecting Salvadoran refugees 
from deportation and providing aid to this growing community.86 Additionally, many of 
the activists that got their start with the Sanctuary Movement have continued fighting for 
the provision of humanitarian aid to asylum-seekers and migrants making the dangerous 
journey from Central America to the U.S. border. For example, Fife, who I mentioned 
was one of the founders of the 1980s Sanctuary Movement, more recently helped found 
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the group No More Deaths in 2004 as the same founding beliefs of the Sanctuary 
Movement. In an article for the Los Angeles Times, Fife is quoted on the topic of No 
More Deaths, saying, in language similar to that of the Sanctuary Movement, that “We 
have every legal right to provide humanitarian aid in a human disaster like the thousands 
of deaths that have occurred here in the Sonoran Desert” after being recently charged, 
prosecuted, and told to desist “interfering” in what is the U.S. Border Patrol’s job, 
according to the federal prosecutor.87  
 
 
Origins and Early Years of El Rescate and CARECEN  
Another important unintended consequence that resulted from the U.S. 
intervention in El Salvador’s Civil War and the resulting Salvadoran Diaspora was the 
increasing focus on the rights of Central American refugees and immigrants within the 
United States. The upsurge in immigration out of Central America to the United States 
began in the 1970s due to similarly escalating conflicts in Nicaragua and Guatemala, and 
further increased with the humanitarian crisis caused by the political violence of El 
Salvador’s Civil War in the 1980s. The individual identities of these refugees were 
diverse, and included “students, labor leaders, religious representatives, and others who 
had been persecuted because of political involvement in their respective countries.”88 
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Developing around the same time as the Los Angeles Sanctuary Movement were two 
nonprofit community organizations that focused specifically on the growing Salvadoran 
community in the Westlake, Pico Union, and MacArthur Park neighborhood of Los 
Angeles.89 This location reflected the transforming neighborhood of Pico Union – 
although it had historically been a poor African American neighborhood, following the 
Central American, and more narrowly Salvadoran, Diaspora, this MacArthur Park region 
became the hub for the Salvadoran refugees arriving to the United States, and is still 
today very recognizably a Salvadoran and Central American community.90  
The first organization, El Rescate, was founded in 1981 by a group of Salvadoran 
refugees who had previous activist experience primarily through schools and universities 
in El Salvador. In the beginning, El Rescate served as a catchall organization for a variety 
of the needs of Central American refugees and also worked to implement a “multi-
faceted approach to address past human rights abuses perpetrated by military and 
paramilitary forces.”91 El Rescate did not attempt to frame the violence as solely one-
sided and coming only from the Salvadoran armed forces but also actively acknowledged 
the violence coming from the FMLN. This distinction allowed for the reports done by El 
Rescate, along with the data on human rights abuses in El Salvador during the Salvadoran 
Civil War, to be much more credible than that coming from either the Salvadoran media 
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or the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador. Additionally, it would be this data on each reported 
circumstance of human rights violations, compiled under El Rescate’s “Index to 
Accountability” leading up to and during the 1992 end of the Salvadoran Civil War that 
the United Nations would use to run a Truth Commission and shape the Salvadoran Peace 
Accords. Therefore, in the beginning, El Rescate not only focused on providing aid to the 
Salvadoran community in Los Angeles, but also on ending the political violence and 
Salvadoran Civil War while also ensuring that there would be an appropriate reference 
point, the Index, to be used in assigning accountability for the human rights violations 
committed throughout the Salvadoran Civil War.92  
El Rescate began as a very small nonprofit organization with only three paid staff 
members – a lawyer and two paralegals – along with a substantial network of activist 
volunteers. This network of volunteers was one of the main reasons for El Rescate’s 
success and influence, because these individuals were largely “Salvadorans linked to an 
array of organizations and social movements,” so, “the NGO was able to factor many of 
the complexities into its work to provoke and facilitate change.”93  Over its 38-year 
history, it has helped thousands of people while remaining relatively small, with a paid 
staff of only 10 people. Because El Rescate was the first of its kind in the United States, it 
attempted to address a wide range of needs of the Los Angeles-based Salvadoran 
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community through the provision of services such as homeless shelters, a medical clinic 
(Clínica Monseñor Oscar Romero or the Archbishop Oscar Romero Clinic), deportation 
defense, and the legal representation of refugees seeking political asylum. El Rescate 
developed a strategy to address the root causes of refugee flow, or the political violence 
within El Salvador, as well as a specific Legal Department, developed in 1987, to petition 
international organizations, such as the United Nations, on the dire situations plaguing the 
Salvadoran refugees.94  
The Central American Refugee Center, or CARECEN, was founded two years 
after El Rescate in 1983 by “a Salvadoran refugee committee, United States church 
leaders, attorneys, and community activists,” and its development was undoubtedly 
influenced by the early successes of both El Rescate and the Los Angeles Sanctuary 
Movement.95 However, CARECEN differs from both El Rescate and the Los Angeles 
Sanctuary Movement in that it is a national organization with four regional offices, in 
addition to the initial office in Los Angeles, in San Francisco, Houston, New York, and 
Washington, D.C., which are, and were during the 1980s, major arrival city hubs for 
Salvadoran and Central American refugees arriving in the United States. The initial office 
in Los Angeles offered “legal and social services to those fleeing the war and, after the 
war, it created new programs, including cultural programs and educational activities for 
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youth.”96 However, like El Rescate and the Los Angeles Sanctuary Movement, 
CARECEN relied heavily on the already existent networks of religious and other activists 
that were already established in El Salvador prior to the Salvadoran Diaspora. 
Additionally, because religion, specifically Catholicism, is a large part of Salvadoran 
identity, the incorporation of this value and the use of religious leaders in activist groups 
was very strategic and contributed to the solidification of a transnational Salvadoran 
identity and community in the Westlake Los Angeles neighborhood.97  
The Sociopolitical Strategy of the Salvadoran “Refugee” Classification  
Due to the aforementioned differences in the United Nations and United States 
definitions of refugee, and because U.S. policy excluded Salvadorans from accessing this 
status, one of the main focuses of the three activist groups, as well as many others, 
focused specifically on advocating for Salvadorans to be identified as refugees in the 
United States. Therefore, these activist community organizations adopted a strategy 
founded in framing Salvadorans as refugees in the United States. Additionally, the initial 
hope of Salvadoran refugees was that the Salvadoran Civil War would be quick. 
However, this hope pretty much fully vanished in 1983 when the “FMLN in El Salvador 
shifted to a strategy of guerra prolongada,” or prolonged war.98 This realization that the 
conditions in El Salvador would not be getting better anytime soon also contributed to the 
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increased activist for the legal, political, and social recognition of the Salvadoran 
communities within the United States as communities of refugees and also led to the 
foundation of more groups like El Rescate and CARECEN that focused specifically on 
“the legal, political, and humanitarian needs of the burgeoning United States Salvadoran 
population.”99 These activist groups, as well as the Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees 
themselves, made an active attempt to invoke a political strategy founded on 
distinguishing themselves from “other immigrant groups on the ground that they were 
entitled to refugee status and had more compelling reasons to be in the United States.”100 
This would remain a key component of the political and legal strategy of the activist 
organizations up until the late 1980s and early 1990s when the switch from the focus of 
Salvadoran identity as refugees to an identity of a legitimate group of immigrants 
deserving of legal status in the United States.101  
Prior to the late 1980s and early 1990s switch from Salvadoran refugee identity to 
Salvadoran immigrant identity, the political tactic of continuously framing Salvadoran 
refugees as refugees, which they were under United Nations law but not United States 
law, was a key component of the political, legal, and humanitarian approaches taken by 
all three of the activist groups previously mentioned. These activists who employed this 
strategy that “sought not only to save lives and prevent deportations, but also to affect the 
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course of the Salvadoran Civil War.”102 By framing Salvadorans in the U.S. as refugees, 
activists hoped to extend federal legislation that would grant Extended Voluntary 
Departure (EVD) status, similar to an early form of Temporary Protected Status, to 
Salvadorans in the U.S. and, therefore, recognize them as refugees. This would not only 
aid the individual lives and communities of Salvadorans that had been established, and 
were the main focus of the activist organizations, but it also, as the activist organizations 
argued, could lead to an earlier end to the Salvadoran Civil War. The activist 
organizations thought that the granting of EVD status to Salvadoran refugees in the U.S. 
could lead to an earlier end in the Salvadoran Civil War because if the U.S. government 
officially recognized Salvadorans in the U.S. as what they were, refugees, “the U.S. 
government would be unable to continue sending military aid to the Salvadoran 
government, which would in turn promote either a guerrilla victory or a negotiated 
settlement.”103  
However, this was a difficult strategy to pursue, especially under the Reagan 
administration which was, by 1987, “supplying over $1 million a day in military and 
other aid to the Salvadoran government,” and therefore continued to recognize 
Salvadorans in the U.S. as economic migrants deserving of deportation rather than 
refugees deserving of protection and aid.104 Activist organizations continued to fight back 
through this necessary legal and political strategy, and they incorporated the publication 
of refugee “testimonies” or narratives of persecution and flight because the activists 
believed that, “just as they had been galvanized into action by hearing detained 
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Salvadorans’ and Guatemalans’ accounts, other listeners’ consciousness about the events 
in Central American policy could be changed by these narratives.”105 This strategy 
continued until, as previously mentioned, the late 1980s and early 1990s and the 
changing political climate within the United States necessitated the change in Salvadoran 
identity from refugee to immigrant.106  
During the early 1980s, Salvadoran activists invoked the refugee identity of the 
Salvadoran communities in the United States and tied it to narrative refugee 
“testimonies” that often included a reminder to the intended audiences of these 
testimonies of the “bombings, tortures, massacres, and other abuses that pervaded El 
Salvador during the Civil War” in order to assert that Salvadorans would have been 
entitled to refugee status in the United States due to their experiences of persecution if the 
United States’ immigration and refugee policy was not biased to exclude refugees from 
“friendly” nations in the context of the Cold War. This strategy was effective in “linking 
this suffering that is grounds for political asylum to the hardship that is a basis for 
suspension of deportation.” Additionally, this framing strategy greatly contributed to the 
activist community organizations’ effort to counter the official position of the U.S. 
government, as shown through a declassified 1987 Department of State memo, that most 
Salvadorans arriving in the 1980s “are not fleeing political persecution, but rather are 
leaving for economic reasons.”107 By advocating for the recognition of those arriving 
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during the Salvadoran Diaspora in the 1980s as refugees, rather than economic migrants, 
the activist community organizations utilized a political strategy that would be most 
effective in countering this official narrative of the U.S. government. However, as the 
1990s began, and more Salvadorans chose to stay in their established communities rather 
than go back to a nation that they had little to no real connection to anymore, framing the 
Salvadoran communities as communities of refugees no longer made the most political 
sense. This led Salvadoran activists to redefine these communities as individuals who had 
set down roots and were entitled to a legal status in the United States while 
simultaneously moving away from the term “refugee,” which had increasingly gained a 
connotation of helplessness and dependency, two terms that no longer fit the well-
established Salvadoran communities. During the 1990s, specifically following the 1992 
Peace Accords, activist organizations furthered this argument for legal status for the 
established Salvadoran communities by arguing that, by recognizing the legal permanent 
residence status of Salvadorans, the United States would be supporting the peace process 
in El Salvador. This argument was founded on the concept that “mass deportations would 
destabilize economic and social reconstruction, potentially giving rise to renewed 
conflict” and contributed to the U.S. government creating the Temporary Protected Status 
(TPS) and first applied it to the Salvadoran communities established throughout the 
Salvadoran Diaspora.108  
Mimicry as the Highest Form of Flattery: The Washington, D.C. Parallel  
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Although El Rescate and CARECEN were the two premier activist community 
organizations involved in providing aid to the growing Salvadoran community in Los 
Angeles, there were many other organizations that existed either before or soon after El 
Rescate and CARECEN. However, it was after the creation of El Rescate and 
CARECEN, and the examples that these activist community organizations set, that either 
preexisting Latin American-focused organizations created a specific El Salvador-centered 
program or entirely new activist organizations were founded. Additionally, although the 
most significant number of Salvadorans arrived and settled in Los Angeles during the 
early 1980s, Washington, DC also had a fairly large increase in Salvadoran population 
within the community during the Salvadoran Diaspora. Therefore, Washington, D.C. and, 
in the later years, the Northern Virginian suburbs of Washington, are an important 
parallel to the Salvadoran refugee experiences in Los Angeles. The groups that existed 
during this early portion of the Salvadoran Diaspora and the Salvadoran Civil War that 
will be covered in this section are the Latin American Youth Center, D.C. (LAYC-DC), 
the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the Committee in Solidarity with 
the People of El Salvador (CISPES). Additionally, although two of these organizations 
focus on Latin America broadly, it was during the 1980-1992 time period, specifically 
following the start of the Salvadoran Diaspora and the creation of El Rescate and 
CARECEN, that these organizations began to either focus specifically on El Salvador or 
establish a program dedicated uniquely to the needs of Salvadorans in the United States.  
The first Washington, D.C.-based activist community organization that dealt 
specifically with the growing Salvadoran community was the Latin American Youth 
Center in DC (LAYC-DC). LAYC-DC was founded in 1968 as a wide-ranging 
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community organization dedicated to “address the absence of services for the emerging 
Latino community” by “offering educational and vocational activities in after school and 
in the summer at several locations in the community.”109 The real focus of the 
organization narrowed around the mid-1980s to provide “social services and mental 
health counseling program to assist traumatized immigrant youth arriving in DC after 
fleeing the civil wars engulfing Central America.”110 It is especially important to note that 
the focus on the provision of aid and a welcoming community to traumatized Central 
American youth fleeing the political violence developed in the years immediately 
following the development of El Rescate and CARECEN in Los Angeles, as well as at 
the same period during which the violence of the Salvadoran Civil War and the resulting 
Salvadoran Diaspora was at its height. Therefore, although the LAYC-DC has a wider 
focus of all of Latin American youth in need of a community within the D.C. area, many 
of its goals and specific programs developed in tandem with increased Salvadoran 
immigration to the D.C. area, said programs mirrored many of those established within 
the Los Angeles community, and many of the programs addressed the specific needs of 
the growing D.C.-based Salvadoran community. In 1974, the LAYC-DC was officially 
recognized as a nonprofit entity with 501(c)(3) status and moved into the Woodrow 
Wilson Center where it stayed until the Wilson Center’s programs grew too big and 
moved into the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. The Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars is “the nation’s key non-partisan policy forum 
for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform 
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actionable ideas for the policy community.”111 The close partnership between the LAYC-
DC and the Wilson Center in both of the organization’s early years was apparent and can 
be seen through the fact that the Latin American Program at the Wilson Center was 
established in 1977. Although El Rescate and CARECEN did not focus specifically on 
the provision of resources dedicated to the building of a community of youth in their 
early years, this did become a focus of both organizations, and other LA-based 
organizations that will be discussed in Chapter 3, as a way to strengthen the Salvadoran 
communities as a whole. However, the LAYC-DC’s focus on creating a community and 
providing a safe space for Salvadoran refugees arriving in DC did closely resemble the 
goals of El Rescate and CARECEN of fostering a way for Salvadorans to have access to 
a group with individuals that had similar experiences, additional educational resources on 
both language and how to apply for citizenship, and a mental health clinic to aid the 
community.  
Another DC-based organization that preexisted the start of the Salvadoran 
Diaspora but adapted to specifically accommodate the increasing Salvadoran community 
in the DC area was the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). WOLA’s early 
focus was more similar to that of the legal aid programs of El Rescate than LAYC-DC, 
especially due to its unique focus on the advocacy for human rights in the Americas. 
WOLA was founded in 1974, so prior to the official start of the Salvadoran conflict and 
Salvadoran Diaspora, by church leaders as a reaction to the U.S. intervention and support 
for the military junta in Chile. Although created prior to the start of El Salvador’s Civil 
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War, the important parts to recognize about this activist community organization is 
twofold. First, WOLA was founded by church leaders, mirroring the importance of the 
Los Angeles-based Sanctuary Movement and the role of church leaders in conjunction 
with Salvadoran activists in establishing El Rescate and CARECEN. Additionally, 
religion is and was a significant portion of Salvadoran identity, so by incorporating 
church leaders into human rights-focused political advocacy would have contributed to 
the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of the Salvadoran community, as well as the 
Latin American community in general. Secondly, WOLA continued to exist, and 
expanded to focus on El Salvador, following the start of the Salvadoran Civil War and the 
increased Salvadoran community in DC resulting from the Salvadoran Diaspora in order 
to “connect policymakers in Washington to those with first-hand knowledge of the 
thousands of deaths, disappearances, cases of torture, and unjust imprisonment occurring 
under the dictatorships of that era.”112 Not only does this purpose very closely resemble 
the use of testimonials under the Sanctuary Movement, but the strategy of increasing the 
awareness of policymakers on the political violence in El Salvador was an ultimate goal 
of El Rescate and CARECEN as part of an attempt to stop the funding going out of the 
U.S. to El Salvador.  
The third and final activist community organization that began during the early 
years of the Salvadoran Civil War and the Salvadoran Diaspora was the Committee in 
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). CISPES’s foundation is different 
from all of the aforementioned activist community organizations in that it started as an 
                                                          




umbrella organization of a widespread and autonomous group of activists. Additionally, 
CISPES was founded “by conventions in Los Angeles and Washington, DC in October of 
1980,” and would grow into a national grassroots solidarity organization focused on 
supporting the Salvadoran people’s “struggle for social and economic justice.”113 The 
impact of the organization’s national grassroots campaign was maximized starting in 
1985 when “CISPES transformed from a loose network into a unified national 
organization committed to a common program, which proved critical.”114 Therefore, the 
focus of CISPES was also more international rather than focused on the domestic issues 
within the communities it was located in like the other organizations previously 
discussed. However, it is important to note that CISPES’s two initial bases were in Los 
Angeles and DC, the two arrival cities in which all of the community-focused 
organizations previously mentioned were located in. This further shows just how 
important the connections between the activists and refugees were to the ultimate creation 
of Salvadoran-led and focused organizations. On a similar note, the centering of 
Salvadoran communities in LA and DC in the early 1980s foreshadowed the importance 
of the physical neighborhoods in establishing a new transnational Salvadoran identity in 
the United States while still maintaining a connection to the refugees’ memories and 
connections to El Salvador due to their access to others who had gone through similar 
experiences. Most of CISPES’s early activities were protest-driven and resulted from the 
Reagan administration’s slogan of “El Salvador is Spanish for Vietnam.” Although the 
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strategies for the other activist community organizations were not quite as protest driven, 
at least not in their early/foundational beginnings, most of them included the same 
ultimate early goal of CISPES: to use highly visible mass protest campaigns in order to 
draw public and policymaker attention to just how negative the ongoing U.S. financial 
and political support for El Salvador’s violent military dictatorship was while at the same 
time showing that the FMLN was not the villain nor were the Salvadoran refugees 
dangerous economic migrants.  
Although the sheer number of Salvadorans entering the Washington, DC area 
during the early years of the Salvadoran Diaspora pales in comparison to its parallel in 
Los Angeles, the growing Salvadoran community in DC was significant compared to the 
rest of the United States. Even though both LAYC-DC and WOLA existed with a focus 
on Central Americans in the DC community prior to the beginning of the Salvadoran 
Civil War and Salvadoran Diaspora, both organizations were greatly impacted and 
adapted by emphasizing a new focus on Salvadorans arriving in DC specifically in the 
early 1980s. Additionally, although WOLA and CISPES both had a greater focus on 
advocacy and protest to influence policymakers regarding foreign policy and immigration 
policy impacting El Salvador, this focus makes logical sense due to the locations of the 
organizations in the capital, which would inevitably give said organizations greater 
access to and visibility from said policymakers. Finally, although the focus on the needs 
of the Salvadoran refugee community based in Los Angeles was much greater than that 
of similar organizations in DC, the activism of said DC organizations served as a 
complimentary parallel to those in Los Angeles, especially in the years following the 
1992 Salvadoran Peace Accords that will be discussed in Chapter Three.   
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Chapter Three: An Increasingly Salvadoran Los Angeles and the Evolution of the 
Activist Community Organizations  
 
 This chapter focuses on the later period of the Civil War in El Salvador as well as 
the aftermath of the 1992 Salvadoran Peace Accords. It traces the evolution of the 
established communities of the Salvadoran Diaspora as well as the creation of new 
activist community organizations, and the evolution of existent ones. This chapter also 
highlights the changes in U.S. law related to immigration, refugee, and relevant foreign 
policies. Finally, this chapter will address both the positive and negative forms of 
unintended consequences that resulted from a combination of the above factors, and how 
said unintended consequences impacts the transnational Salvadoran community in the 
U.S. and El Salvador, as well as the present-day consequences of these unintended 
consequences and the role of the mass media.  
U.S. Legislation and Immigration Policies  
Around the mid-1980s, a number of political shifts happened within U.S. law that 
would directly impact the growing Salvadoran immigrant communities. These policies 
greatly impacted the legal status of Salvadoran immigrants, the roles played by the 
already established activist community organizations, and the increasingly tense 
relationship between the United States and Central America.  
Up until the mid-1980s, the primary way Salvadorans could have legal status in 
the U.S. was achieved by applying for political asylum. This, as well as refugee status, as 
previously mentioned in Chapter Two, was quite difficult for Salvadorans to achieve. To 
be granted political asylum, one had to have documented proof of a “well-founded fear of 
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persecution,” for example. Due to the nature of the conflict, where the U.S. sided with the 
Salvadoran government – the group that was perpetuating violence and repression – it 
was politically complicated for Salvadorans to be granted asylum from an ally of the U.S. 
government. Not surprisingly, many Salvadorans did not obtain legal status in the United 
States during this pre-1986 era.   
The first piece of federal legislation to be adopted during the Salvadoran Diaspora 
was the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986. IRCA was the first major 
revision of American immigration legislation and was an amendment to the 1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act. The main provisions of IRCA allowed for the 
legalization of undocumented migrants who had been continuously present in the U.S. 
since 1982, created official punishments for employers that knowingly hired 
undocumented workers, and required increased monitoring and enforcement at U.S. 
borders. This greatly impacted a large portion of the Salvadoran refugee community, 
many of whom still did not have a legal status in the United States due to the 
nonrecognition of Salvadoran migrants as refugees, largely by seemingly providing a 
path to legal status that, in reality, would still be quite difficult to access.115  
Most Salvadorans came into the United States after 1982, because the violence of 
the Salvadoran Civil War increased dramatically following the strengthened activities of 
the organization of the FMLN, and the subsequent response of the Salvadoran Armed 
Forces, in 1983. Additionally, because Los Angeles was a key arrival city for Salvadoran 
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migrants, IRCA “imposed particular challenges in Los Angeles given the large 
undocumented population in the region, which included not only refugees but also many 
other immigrants, chiefly Mexicans and Central Americans.”116 Additionally, prior to and 
even after the passage of IRCA, the main legal concern of the Salvadoran community 
was “to avoid deportation, not to legalize their stay,”117 therefore, few Salvadorans 
applied for a legal status unless they had been apprehended by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS). Initially, many Salvadoran refugees were disinterested in 
obtaining legal status in the U.S. because they believed that the Civil War would be short, 
yet effective, and that they would be able to return to their homes and families relatively 
soon. As the Civil War dragged on, and the violence and persecution devastated El 
Salvador, many of the refugees realized that this hope was not the reality and, therefore, 
began to seek legal status. Similarly, for Salvadorans who did seek legal status in the 
United States under IRCA, the court cases were largely unsuccessful. For these reasons, 
IRCA was not as effective as it was intended to be, especially in Los Angeles where 
activist community organizations worked to find loopholes in the law and continued to 
pursue other sociopolitical and legal strategies outside of IRCA in order to continue to 
provide aid to the Salvadoran community.118  
Outrage over the U.S. immigration and refugee policies that seemingly excluded 
Salvadorans from accessing the legal asylum or refugee status characterized the period 
leading up to and including the mid-1980s. This outrage had manifested into a legal suit 
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against the U.S. Attorney General and the head of the INS in 1985. Although this lawsuit 
was first filed in 1985, and the court granted the plaintiffs the right to litigate the “issue of 
a pattern and practice of discrimination carried out by the INS by denying the asylum 
claims and refusing extended voluntary departure to these refugees,”119 nothing really 
came to fruition until 1990. In American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, which is 
colloquially referred to as the ABC lawsuit, the main plaintiff, the American Baptist 
Churches, alleged that the U.S. Attorney General and the head of the INS “violated 
domestic and international laws when they denied asylum to Salvadorans and 
Guatemalans fleeing political repression in the 1980s.”120 The suit argued that by not 
allowing for equal access to asylum or refugee status for individuals from “friendly” 
nations, like El Salvador and Guatemala, compared to “unfriendly” nations, like 
Nicaragua, demonstrated how the U.S. asylum process was inherently biased against 
refugees facing political violence, repression, and persecution coming from nations in 
which the U.S. supports the governing regime in power. Additionally, although the court 
recognized the plaintiff’s right to litigate these issues, it also maintained that international 
refugee law, like that of the United Nations, does not supersede the domestic U.S. 1980 
Refugee Act. Although the ABC lawsuit was not wholly successful in every aspect, it did 
lead and contribute greatly to the passage of the 1990 Immigration Reform Act and gave 
Salvadoran refugees who had been denied asylum after 1980 the opportunity to have their 
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asylum applications re-adjudicated, or reviewed for a second time, through a legal 
process to receive formal judgment on the disputed asylum status.121  
A major factor of the Immigration Reform Act of 1990 was the provision that 
created the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program. Just as its name suggests, TPS 
gives individuals to have a temporary legal status within the United States. Salvadorans 
were the first recipients of TPS. TPS also provided the legal space for Salvadorans to 
reapply for political asylum under rules that prevented the previous bias against granting 
asylum to migrants from “friendly” nations. TPS meant that the U.S. government 
implicitly acknowledged that Salvadorans had a right to be in the United States because 
of the conditions in El Salvador “that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from 
returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the 
return of its nationals adequately.” Both of these conditions directly applied to the still 
Civil War-stricken Salvadoran state until 1992 and, following the end of the Civil War, 
the weakened Salvadoran state institutions unprepared to effectively repatriate the 
substantial number of Salvadorans who had left during the Salvadoran Diaspora.122  
Although Nicaragua had a revolution over similar issues as El Salvador, the 
Nicaraguan revolutionary group, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was 
able to successfully oust the repressive Somoza dictatorship from political power in 1979. 
Therefore, from 1979 to 1990, the FSLN was in control of the Nicaraguan government. 
Additionally, from 1981 to 1990, Nicaragua suffered through the Contra War, which was 
an uprising against the revolutionary FSLN government by the Contras, which was a 
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counter-revolutionary group that was backed by the U.S. in a manner similar to the U.S. 
backing of the Salvadoran government during the Salvadoran Civil War. Like the 
Salvadoran Civil War, this was a long drawn-out and bloody conflict. However, the 
Contra War, unlike the Salvadoran Civil War, has been much more historically 
contextualized as a Cold War “proxy war” between the United States through the Contras 
and the Soviet Union and Cuba through the FSLN. This contributed to why, under U.S. 
asylum and immigration policy, Nicaraguan refugees fleeing an “unfriendly” FSLN 
revolutionary government were accepted while Salvadorans, fleeing a “friendly” U.S.-
backed government, were not. The point is that much of the immigration law directed to 
Central Americans throughout the Cold War was piecemeal and contradictory. Therefore, 
the U.S.’s antagonism towards the Nicaraguan government ultimately opened the door 
for Salvadoran legal status.  
The final piece of national U.S. legislation from the 1990s that directly impacted 
the Salvadoran community came five years after the official end of the Salvadoran Civil 
War. The Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), passed 
in 1997, was initially created to apply to Nicaraguans alone. NACARA addressed the 
difficulty in the re-adjudication of asylum cases promised by the ABC suit that many 
Central Americans were having under the Immigration Act of 1990 and the TPS 
provision. NACARA creates the possibility of “amnesty for Nicaraguans who entered the 
United States before December 1, 1995, and restores suspension [of deportation] 
eligibility for ABC class members, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans who applied for 
asylum before April 1, 1990.”123 Many of the activist groups continued to work on 
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obtaining a legal status for the Salvadoran communities under NACARA by linking the 
social situation within El Salvador to Nicaragua and made multiple arguments on the 
potentially destabilizing effects on the Americas as a whole that would result from the 
mass deportations that would inevitably come from not extending a form of legal status to 
Salvadorans similar to that extended to Nicaraguans. Although IRCA, the ABC suit, TPS, 
and NACARA all addressed portions of immigration and refugee policy issues that 
complicated Salvadoran migration, all four still had gaps in legal protections that activist 
community organizations would be crucial in during the post-Peace Accords period 
through legal advocacy and general aid. However, these policies that characterized the 
political climate relating to Central American immigration in the 1990s would also 
redefine the struggle for refugee and immigrant rights and, consequently, redefine the 
necessary role of the activist community organizations in the period following the end of 
the Salvadoran Civil War.124  
1992 Peace Accords  
 The Chapultepec Peace Accords were a seemingly huge success for the people of 
El Salvador and the international community concerned with El Salvador’s history of 
human rights violations and inequality. Following the FMLN’s 1989 “Second Final 
Offensive,” the transition to peace and disarmament within El Salvador began. The 
transition took place between 1990 and 1992. Peace negotiations were an international 
affair that relied heavily on the leadership and structure of the United Nations because 
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tensions were very high between the warring factions. The Chapultepec Peace Accords, 
which was the negotiated end to the Salvadoran Civil War, has been cited as a great 
success by the international community. However, that ultimate ending point was very 
difficult to achieve and was due to a variety of intersection factors both within El 
Salvador domestically and within the international community as a whole. In 1989, the 
hope of a real negotiated peace seemed far-fetched. The first reason for this negative 
outlook was due to the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) political party winning 
the Salvadoran presidency. ARENA was the political party founded by the U.S.-backed 
Salvadoran oligarchy that was in charge of, and the progenitor of, the human rights 
abuses of the military dictatorship and the group that the FMLN was fighting throughout 
the Civil War. This alone seemingly threatened the chance of any negotiated peace 
settlement in El Salvador’s near future. Additionally, the November 1989 “Second Final 
Offensive,” an offensive that has been referred to colloquially as “the El Salvador Tet,” 
was launched by the FMLN in the hopes of ending the Civil War through an FMLN 
victory over the ARENA government. In response to this “Second Final Offensive,” the 
Salvadoran military continued to commit a number of human rights violations including 
the murder of six Jesuit priests which sparked the outrage of the international community. 
Yet, despite this series of increasingly terrible events that seemingly would make the 
potential of a negotiated peace settlement a far-off dream, the Chapultepec Peace 
Accords were signed by all parties involved in the Salvadoran Civil War just three years 
later.125  
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 In contrast to the FMLN’s “First Final Offensive,” mentioned in Chapter One, in 
which the FMLN was clearly unprepared to wage a full-on Civil War against the 
Salvadoran military dictatorship, the “Second Final Offensive” revealed just how evenly 
matched the two sides of the Salvadoran Civil War had become. As one assessment of the 
Salvadoran peace process put it, “the 1989 FMLN offensive starkly dramatized the fact 
that the military situation was stalemated; specifically, while this offensive showed that 
the FMLN had the ability to launch a major, sustained, countrywide offensive, it also 
showed that the El Salvadoran military was strong enough to indefinitely prevent the 
FMLN from being able to stage the sort of victorious “final offensive” that the 
Nicaraguan Sandinistas had launched in July 1979.”126 This acceptance of a relative 
stalemate for the foreseeable future of the conflict, as well as the economic, social, and 
political toll and stress this ongoing conflict would place on both sides and the general 
public of El Salvador, was reinforced by the ending of the Cold War in 1989. Not only 
did this drastically change how the Salvadoran Civil War was conceptualized in the 
international community, but it also led to a dramatic decrease in outside support and 
assistance from the United States, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and revolutionary movements 
in the surrounding Latin American nations to both sides of the Salvadoran Civil War. 
Additionally, with the ending of the Cold War and the decrease in interest in the small 
Central American nation from the global superpowers, specifically the United States, “an 
                                                          
Central American Community Organizations in Los Angeles,” 165-166; Lawrence Michael Ladutke, 
Freedom of Expression in El Salvador: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy (Jefferson: 
McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2004): 44-48; Irina Carlota Silber, Everyday Revolutionaries: 
Gender, Violence, and Disillusionment in Postwar El Salvador (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 
2011): 38-40; Bertram I. Spector, Negotiating Peace and Confronting Corruption: Challenges for 
Postconflict Societies (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2011): 25-32; Peter W. Van 
Arsdale, Forced to Flee: Human Rights and Human Wrongs in Refugee Homelands (Lanham: Lexington 
Books, 2006): 106-110.   
126 Evans, “The El Salvadoran Peace Process Five Years On,” 172.  
  
84 
opening was created for various other international actors to do what they had tried to do 
(with little success) during the Cold War – to mediate a negotiated settlement of the 
conflict.”127 The two largest, and most influential, international organizations that led this 
new push for a negotiated peace settlement and transition to democracy were the United 
Nations and Amnesty International, both of which had played a role during the Cold War 
but were ultimately overshadowed by both the roles of both sides of Salvadoran actors 
within the conflict and the United States. Although the United Nations and Amnesty 
International played the most significant roles in the transition from massive violence, 
repression, and human rights violations to a negotiated peace and democracy, 
organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) and various religious 
groups that were, for the most part, founded in the Catholic Church.128  
 Throughout the Salvadoran Civil War, Amnesty International had been compiling 
data on and releasing reports detailing the human rights situation within El Salvador. 
These reports contributed greatly to the ability of the United Nations to both negotiate a 
peace settlement and establish a Truth Commission intended to hold human rights 
violations perpetrators on both sides of the Salvadoran Civil War accountable for their 
role in the conflict. Additionally, during the early stages of negotiation, both the FMLN 
and the ARENA-led Salvadoran government agreed to allow for the establishment of a 
United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) which would begin its 
initial work in 1991 for one year and then have its presence in El Salvador extended until 
1995. However, prior to the ONUSAL establishing a Truth Commission dedicated to 
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combatting impunity within El Salvador and leading to the assignment of accountability 
and responsibility for the human rights violations that were committed throughout the 
Salvadoran Civil War, the 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords needed to be negotiated and 
agreed upon by the FMLN and the Salvadoran government.129  
 The Salvadoran process to peace included a series of four agreements that 
culminated in the Chapultepec Peace Accords over the two-year period of negotiations 
largely mediated by the United Nations. These agreements and negotiations covered a 
wide range of topics, including, but not limited to, “economic and social problems (for 
example, land reform), demobilization and integration of FMLN and government soldiers 
back into civilian society, and confronting the country’s tragic past, including its systemic 
violation of human rights.”130 This emphasis on the need for land reform in a more 
equitable way was an issue that historically had plagued El Salvador and had been a large 
motivation for both the aforementioned revolts that ended with the 1932 La Matanza as 
well as a large motivating goal of the creation of the umbrella organization of the FMLN. 
In fact, issues surrounding the desire for land reform had been a significant motivating 
factor in many of the other Central American revolutions in which the United States 
intervened in during the Cold War era. In El Salvador, and under the Peace Accords, this 
desire for land reform culminated in the creation of the accord-mandated program called 
the Programa de Transferencia de Tierras, or the Land Transfer Program (PTT). The 
PTT mandated that “over the six years following the signing of the accords, 10% of the 
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nation’s agricultural land was transferred to ex-combatants of both sides and to civilian 
supporters of the FMLN.”131 Although this land reform was significant, it was not the 
only portion of the Peace Accords that would contribute to the transition to peace and 
democracy in El Salvador.132  
Additionally, the Peace Accords established three separate yet interconnected 
mechanisms in order to focus on and adequately address El Salvador’s history of a 
pattern of human rights violations. These three strategies were founded in “mandating 
structural reforms, creating a quasi-judicial Ad Hoc Commission to remove from military 
service those implicated in human rights violations and corruption, and creating a Truth 
Commission to compile an official public accounting of El Salvador’s history of human 
rights abuses.”133 The United Nations was particularly highlighted for laying the 
groundwork to democracy through “a scaling back of the Salvadoran armed forces and 
their subordination to civilian authority, the demilitarization of public security through 
creation of a new civilian police force, and broad reforms of the Salvadoran justice 
system.”134 Unfortunately, many of the agreed upon negotiations were not fully achieved 
following the end of the Peace Accords, contributing to the “new” wave of violence and 
inequality in El Salvador that was founded in organized crime, a continuously corrupt 
government, and a still highly militarized, biased, and violent police force. For example, 
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although the Peace Accords and the ONUSAL Truth Commission promised judicial 
reform and an increased accountability for the perpetrators for the human rights 
violations of both sides of the Salvadoran Civil War, this was made more difficult by the 
passing of a wide-encompassing blanket amnesty and impunity law only five days after 
the final version of the negotiated peace agreement was ratified. While the Chapultepec 
Peace Accords did end the massive and ongoing human rights violations and political 
persecutions that characterized the Salvadoran Civil War, they failed to follow through 
with the complete implementation and continuation of all of the various negotiated 
agreements between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government. This created a new kind 
of unofficial, as in no longer state-sponsored, type of violence and political persecution 
facing El Salvador from the 1990s until the present and contributed to the out-migration 
of Salvadorans to the United States for years to come. The failure to achieve peace, so to 
speak, resulted in an increasingly complex relationship between El Salvador and the 
United States. This is also a great factor in the transformation of identities and roles of 
the activist community organizations focused on Salvadorans in the United States.  
A Shift in Strategy of the Activist Community Organizations  
Meanwhile, as the Salvadoran Civil War was coming to an end and the 
Chapultepec Peace Accords were being ratified, a different, yet just as significant, change 
in the approaches of U.S.-based activist community organizations serving the growing 
Salvadoran communities in the United States was occurring. This shift in strategy also 
occurred alongside the shift in immigration, refugee, and foreign policy of the United 
States. Even in the later years of the Salvadoran Civil War while activists were still 
generally referring to Salvadorans as “refugees,” many of the individual Salvadorans 
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began settling and establishing roots in their communities after recognizing that the Civil 
War was not going to be short nor were the long-term impacts and damage caused by the 
fighting going to be quickly or easily repairable. This led to an increase in Salvadoran 
businesses and restaurants within the urban Los Angeles community, further showing 
both the “vibrancy and permanence of the community.”135 It was during this moment that 
preexisting activist community organizations, like El Rescate and CARECEN, began to 
reassess their strategic claim that Salvadorans, and other Central Americans, were 
refugees and moved towards referring to the members of their communities as 
immigrants. This strategic shift was even implemented on an institutional level within 
CARECEN through the changing of its name from the Central American Refugee Center 
to the Central American Resource Center. As activist community organizations redefined 
themselves and the Salvadoran community, the goals of the organizations were redefined 
as well, going from striving for the legalization in the 1980s as a means to prevent 
“untimely and perhaps life-threatening deportations,” to the 1990s goal of legitimization 
of the transnational identity Salvadoran community by “securing the legal rights enjoyed 
by citizens and legal permanent residents” for said Salvadoran communities who had 
established roots in the United States.136  
During the 1990s, the strategy of activist community organizations shifted in 
order to argue for the legitimization of the legal status of the members of distinctly 
Salvadoran communities within the United States on the basis of their “now lengthy 
period of residence, the ties they have created, the work they have performed, the taxes 
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they have paid, and the role that the United States played in the conflict that caused them 
to emigrate.”137 This strategic shift was arguably necessary for multiple reasons, the first 
of which was that the term “refugee” inherently implied that the need for U.S. residency 
was based solely on the temporary conditions of El Salvador and, following the end of 
the Civil War and the implementation of the Peace Accords, this strategy no longer had 
as compelling grounds to stand on compared to the very obvious and visible issues of 
violence and persecution of the Civil War. Therefore, under this track of argumentation, 
the strategy of self-identifying the Salvadoran community as refugees was no longer 
likely to succeed which led to an increased risk of deportation. The second major 
rationale for the switch in strategy from classifying Salvadorans as refugees to classifying 
them as immigrants was because of the “negative connotations” that were/are associated 
with the term refugee. These connotations, especially during the 1990s, were associated 
with individuals or groups who were powerless, helpless, or fleeing. Activists recognized 
that not only did these connotations not adequately embody the Salvadoran experience, 
but they also did not depict the Salvadoran community within Los Angeles as “a 
successful community that had set down roots in the United States and intended to 
stay.”138 These established roots were embodied by not only the establishment of activist 
community organizations dedicated to the Salvadoran community, but also through the 
creation of businesses on the El Salvador Community Corridor in Westlake and the 
revitalization of the MacArthur Park space. Additionally, in support of this argument, 
activist community organizations pointed to the fact that many Salvadoran Los Angeles 
residents maintained good standing in the communities they helped to develop by acting 
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“like a good citizen,” contrary to the mass media’s extensive coverage and fearmongering 
related to “Central American” gangs like MS13.139   
Activist community organizations that led this shift in strategy also were most 
often heavily involved in not just the social sphere, but the legal and political spheres as 
well. By continuously advocating for the legal residency status of the Salvadoran 
immigrant population, and having both major and minor successes and setbacks through 
the gradual increase in accessibility of legal residency status for Salvadorans who arrived 
during the Salvadoran Diaspora as shown through the series of various pieces of 
legislation aforementioned directly relating to the Salvadoran battle for changes in the 
U.S. asylum and immigration laws, the activist community organizations established 
during and after the Salvadoran Diaspora made a real difference in the Los Angeles 
Central American community during the late 1980s and 1990s. Said activist community 
organizations were also able to gain success in their goal of obtaining legal residency 
status for Salvadorans through the argument that the individuals who made up the 
Salvadoran communities were justified in their claims to legal residency membership by 
reminding both policymakers and the general public of the dreadful experiences in El 
Salvador during the Civil War that ultimately caused the Salvadoran Diaspora in the first 
place. Activists, thus, persuasively reminded people “of the bombings, tortures, 
massacres, and other abuses that pervaded El Salvador during the Civil War” in order to 
further support their overarching argument that Salvadorans would have been entitled to 
asylum during the 1980s and legal residency status in the 1990s had their claims been 
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adjudicated fairly.140 This strategy went beyond simply pointing out the bias in the U.S. 
asylum courts by “linking this suffering that is grounds for political asylum to the 
hardship that is a basis for suspension of deportation” in order to not-so-subtly imply that 
“the past hardship that caused immigration is as relevant to legalization as the future 
hardship that deportation would pose.”141 Moreover, in relation to this argument against 
mass deportations, activist community organizations pointed to the still present danger 
awaiting many Salvadoran citizens if they were to return to El Salvador, specifically, the 
new post-Peace Accords crisis of the Salvadoran state of “contemporary 
“disappearances” due to organized crime, with multiple thousands of victims believed to 
have gone missing in recent years.”142  
Along with the two aforementioned arguments, activist community organizations 
made two broader final arguments for their shift in strategy from framing Salvadorans as 
refugees to immigrant communities worthy of legal residency status. The first of these 
wide-ranging arguments was that the United States, due especially because of its 
involvement in the Salvadoran Civil War and in Cold War-era Central America in 
general, had a moral responsibility to accept Central Americans as residents because 
without U.S. intervention it was unlikely that the Salvadoran Diaspora would have 
happened, or would have been as extensive, or as long lasting as it was. The persuasive 
qualities of this very emotionally charged and hypothetical argument when made in 
combination with the other arguments, was a very strong point made by the activist 
                                                          
140 Coutin, Legalizing Moves, 149.  
141 Coutin, Legalizing Moves, 149.  
142 Godoy, “Finding El Salvador’s Disappeared,” 246; Coutin, Legalizing Moves, 149-155; Booth, Wade, 
and Walker, Understanding Central America, 300-302; Coutin, “From Refugees to Immigrants,” 915-917; 
Chang and Diaz-Veizades, Ethnic Peace in the American City, 84-91.  
  
92 
community organizations. The second broad argument was that by supporting the activist 
community organization’s goal of legal residency status, the United States would be 
playing a crucial role in the young Salvadoran peace process. To support this claim, 
activists argued that without the application of some form of sweeping legal residency 
status to the established Salvadoran community members, there was a high risk of mass 
deportations of Salvadorans out of the United States and to El Salvador. Any nation that 
would have to face a sudden influx of people needing repatriation in a short amount of 
time would struggle, however, the new state institutions that arose out of the recent Peace 
Accords in conjunction with both a weakened governmental authority and a general 
public traumatized from the Civil War’s twelve-year period of violence would make 
recovering from the Civil War and fully implementing the goals of the peace process 
especially difficult. Therefore, as activist community organizations argued, “mass 
deportations would destabilize economic and social reconstruction, potentially giving rise 
to renewed conflict.”143 This argument, although ultimately unsuccessful in acquiring 
sweeping legal residency status for Salvadorans in the U.S. or fully preventing its goal of 
mass deportations, was a very strategic move on the part of the activist community 
organizations. For one thing, this argument framed the role of the United States as vitally 
important in the “new” history of post-Peace Accords El Salvador which subliminally 
played off of the ever-present view, especially in the post-Cold War-era, that the United 
States was, and was needed to continue to be, the dominant hegemonic power in the 
American sphere of influence. Secondly, the activist community organizations implied 
that without U.S. support El Salvador risked failing economically, socially, and 
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politically in achieving the goals of the Peace Accords. Additionally, without U.S. 
support, El Salvador could be at risk of starting, or restarting, a Central American conflict 
similar to that of the Cold War-era Civil War. Although both broad arguments were fairly 
persuasive on their own, when argued in conjunction with both the contention that the 
Salvadoran immigrant community in Westlake had set down roots and were productively 
and positively contributing to the Los Angeles community as a whole as well as an 
argument founded in reminding the U.S. policymakers and general public of the causal 
role of the U.S. intervention in driving the Salvadoran Diaspora, the activist community 
organizations’ shift in strategy from framing Salvadoran members of the communities as 
refugees to immigrants worthy of legal residency status was relatively persuasive and 
comprehensive. Additionally, the shift in strategy was, at least in the short run, fairly 
successful in driving the success of the ABC lawsuit, the resulting TPS program being 
first applied to Salvadorans, and to the, albeit not permanent or generalized, legal 
residency of members of the Salvadoran immigrant community.  
The Evolution of El Rescate and CARECEN  
 El Rescate and CARECEN both played a crucial role in the shifting of strategy in 
order to better cater to the evolving needs of the Los Angeles-based Salvadoran 
community in the post-Peace Accords era. After experiencing a short “identity crisis,” 
these organizations began to reflect the changing needs of the Salvadoran community 
within the changing sociopolitical climates of both the United States and El Salvador by 
beginning to orient their “political activities towards pushing for legal permanent 
residence for Salvadorans” as well as beginning to provide “the kinds of services that 
long-term settlers might utilize, such as educational programs, legal services, and the 
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promotion of home ownership, savings, and investment.”144 Additionally, looking at 
these organizations in the even more long-term scope of their goals and purpose 
presently, El Rescate and CARECEN have built on those goals and have “turned their 
energies to providing the sorts of social services that more established migrants need, 
including information about higher education, purchasing homes, professional licensing, 
and legal aid.”145 This transition in the identities of El Rescate and CARECEN was not 
seamless nor did it happen overnight, but, throughout the transition, both organizations 
were able to continue to serve the Salvadoran community within Los Angeles and while 
at the same time advocate for the creation of a legal residency status for the Salvadoran 
immigrant population. This was possible both because of the established histories of the 
two organizations as well as because of the increasing number of activist community 
organizations that were established in Los Angeles throughout the late-1980s and 1990s 
period of transition.   
 During the transition from conflict to peace following the 1992 Peace Accords, El 
Rescate played a crucial role in both El Salvador and Los Angeles. Since the 
establishment of El Rescate’s Human Rights Department in 1985, El Rescate had 
“monitored, maintained a database of violations, and…published reports on the country’s 
human rights situation.” However, in the years leading up to the ultimate ratification of 
the Peace Accords, El Rescate’s goals “shifted from documenting and denouncing human 
rights abuses to defining a strategy for facilitating positive social change in El Salvador 
based on human rights law.”146 In order to achieve this, El Rescate focused largely on the 
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obstructions caused by the generalized impunity law passed five days following the Peace 
Accords that limited the scope of the process of determining accountability for the 
violence throughout the Salvadoran Civil War. Under the Peace Accords, which were 
monitored by a United Nations Special Mission, El Rescate gained a fairly large win 
because of the Peace Accords’ provisions dedicated to “significant structural changes in 
the Salvadoran security forces, the creation of an Ad Hoc Commission to “purify” the 
security forces of human rights abusers, and a Truth Commission designed to create an 
official human rights history.”147 Although not all of these mandates would actually come 
to full fruition, they did set a standard against any potential future similar military 
dictatorships or cases of state sponsored political violence and human rights violations in 
El Salvador.148  
Additionally, under El Rescate’s leadership, the issues surrounding impunity, 
amnesty, and accountability were addressed through a fact-based reporting tool entitled 
the Index to Accountability. The Index covered the entire 12-year period of the Civil 
War, and its findings were based largely on the data from Tutela Legal, a Salvadoran-
based human rights organization, and a two-year study completed by El Rescate. 
According to Salvador Sanabria, the founder and current head of El Rescate, the “Index 
became like an official source of information for the U.S. government and the Canadian 
government to be used against human rights violations perpetrators applying for 
adjustment of status in the U.S. or Canada, or for those that the governments of the U.S. 
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and Canada established that they committed fraud by admitting to answer questions as to 
their military, police, or persecutor status.”149 Although the database is not currently 
available online, its publication is being worked on under the Center for Human Rights at 
the University of Washington in Seattle under the leadership of Angelina Snodgrass 
Godoy with the goal of publishing it online and making it available to researchers at 
some point later this year. It was the information compiled under the Index that, 
according to Sanabria, “provided critical information to the UN’s Peace Accords Special 
Mission in El Salvador to advise them in the work of the Truth Commission, and the 
Truth Commission set up by the UN worked by publishing reports on the atrocities 
committed during the war and established who were responsible for those.”150 This focus 
on documenting and denouncing human rights abuses within El Rescate through the 
Index to Accountability in order to contribute to the process of accountability that was 
absent throughout the Salvadoran Civil War and during the actual writing of the Peace 
Accords remained a major portion of El Rescate’s focus until the mid-1990s. The focus 
then shifted again to “defining a strategy for facilitating positive social change in El 
Salvador based on human rights law.”151 This shift recognized the need for a focus on 
accountability in El Salvador’s past history, but also on the ongoing issues preventing full 
recovery in the collective Salvadoran social memory that stemmed largely from the 
“institutionalized impunity for past human rights abuses in El Salvador.”152   
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As for El Rescate’s changes in goals and programs reflecting the 1990s shift in 
the specific needs of the Los Angeles Salvadoran community from its foundation in 1981, 
many new programs have become a part of El Rescate. For example, although El Rescate 
had previously focused on the legal and sociopolitical structures and legislation that 
directly impacted the growing community of Salvadorans in the Los Angeles area, after 
the end of the Civil War, El Rescate focused on the legal need of Salvadorans in the 
adjudication of individual immigration court cases. Sanabria emphasized the importance 
of this focus, both in the 1990s as well as in the more modern era, especially under the 
Trump administration presently, but also emphasized the establishment of El Rescate’s 
citizenship program, saying that “we consider that [citizenship is] the most effective 
shield against the xenophobic and anti-immigrant policies of this current administration 
governing our country is to have U.S. citizenship.”153 Another program developed around 
the same time of the signing of the 1992 Peace Accords was that of a transnational 
program under which El Rescate extended the reach of their humanitarian aid and legal 
programs into their already established role of defending the rights of immigrants living 
in the Los Angeles community. Additionally, this transnational program sought to 
“educate immigrants migrating in irregular forms from Central America to the United 
States in how to protect their rights on their way to the United States” because of the 
need, in the case of Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans, “to cross two or three 
nations and they need to face, they will face, different realities in their trek though the 
territories of those nations.”154 Overall, from the 1980s to the 1990s to the present, El 
Rescate maintained and increased their role in providing services unique to the evolving 
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needs of the growing Salvadoran communities in Los Angeles and greatly contributed to 
the Los Angeles-based Salvadoran community’s recognition as legitimate immigrants 
deserving of legal residency status, and all the benefits that come along with this status, 
in the United States.155  
CARECEN, like El Rescate, also maintained and grew their role in Los Angeles 
after the 1992 Peace Accords. According to its website, over the thirty years CARECEN 
has existed, it has gone from “a small grassroots group to the largest Central American 
organization in the country, providing low-cost immigration legal services, policy 
advocacy in immigration, education reform and workers’ rights, and organizing know-
how for parents, youth and workers.”156 CARECEN’s website also specifically 
acknowledges the shift in strategy of many of the activist community organizations that 
have a focus on the Salvadoran Los Angeles community from refugee to immigrant by 
stating that “its clients also changed, from refugees fleeing war to vibrant immigrant 
families and workers sinking roots in the United States.”157 CARECEN, like El Rescate, 
recognized the importance of educational services to the established Salvadoran 
community in Los Angeles, and provides “education, enrichment, and leadership 
development programs for children, youth, and adults through its Parent Center, Youth 
Center, and citizenship classes.”158 In addition to CARECEN’s Los Angeles 
headquarters, a sister office was established in Washington, D.C. Although this office 
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was established at the same time as CARECEN in Los Angeles, it really began to grow in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, coinciding with the increase of Salvadorans migrating to 
the Washington, D.C. area. The shift in the focus of programs in both CARECEN-LA 
and CARECEN-DC reflected the evolving needs of the growing Central American 
communities surrounding the two arrival city hubs and, like El Rescate, no longer just 
focused on ensuring that the immigrant communities were legalized but that the 
individuals within the community were accepted and able to further establish roots within 
the United States. CARECEN did this through a series of new 1990s community support 
services like job application help, document translation, job searches, and obtaining 
insurance and housing. Additionally, the legal advocacy of CARECEN during the 1990s, 
especially in the D.C. area, was especially vital in helping reform the aforementioned 
series of refugee and immigration laws that “destabilized the residency statuses of many 
Central American immigrants.” Although CARECEN clearly continued to play a very 
significant role in the lives of the Salvadoran communities during the 1990s, one of the 
greatest, yet less direct, impacts that it had was on the creation of two new activist 
community organizations: The Salvadoran American Leadership and Education Fund 
(SALEF) and the Asociación de Salvadoreños in Los Angeles (ASOSAL).  
New Activist Community Organizations  
In the 1990s, two new activist community organizations that had direct ties with 
CARECEN were founded in the Los Angeles community. The first of these organizations 
to be established was the Asociación de Salvadoreños in Los Angeles (ASOSAL). 
ASOSAL was established in 1991 as a direct offshoot of CARECEN with the intended 
purpose to “fight for an immigration legal status and to defend the rights of 
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immigrants.”159 A secondary goal of ASOSAL was to help create a cultural space to 
allow for a distinctly Salvadoran “cultural identification” that could be disseminated to 
future generations of Salvadoran-Americans that ran the risk of being disconnected from 
El Salvador. The initial purpose for its establishment was to focus solely on obtaining an 
extension of the TPS program for Salvadorans and, in conjunction with El Rescate and 
CARECEN, ASOSAL lobbies the U.S. and Salvadoran governments to “promote the 
establishment of legal permanent residency for Salvadorans in the United States.”160 
ASOSAL’s greatest achievement is the grassroots support that it has been able to drum 
up in the support of its legal advocacy and cultural programs. However, by working 
alongside of El Rescate and CARECEN, ASOSAL has also been able to focus on 
providing educational, cultural, and social services that blend the Salvadoran identity 
with the American identity through providing English and citizenship classes that would 
increase the integration of the Salvadoran community members into the greater 
multicultural Los Angeles area while at the same time not abandoning but, rather, 
encouraging the continuation of distinctly Salvadoran culture and identity within the 
community. This thematic focus on education and the blending of the Salvadoran identity 
with the American identity into a transnational Salvadoran-American identity came out of 
the post-Peace Accords shift in strategy of organizational focus on gaining acceptance for 
the established Salvadoran communities. Additionally, these types of programs would 
continue to grow in importance throughout the 1990s until they were just as important 
within the communities served as the initial legal and political focus of activist 
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community organizations and programs, like El Rescate and CARECEN, that came out of 
the 1980s and the Salvadoran Diaspora during the Civil War.161  
The second organization that emerged in the 1990s, the Salvadoran American 
Leadership and Education Fund (SALEF), also embodied this new increased emphasis on 
the transnational Salvadoran-American identity and the promotion of the importance of 
education for Salvadoran youth in Los Angeles. SALEF was founded by Carlos 
Vaquerano, who had previously worked as a community activist for CARECEN, in 1996 
with the stated mission to “promote the civic participation and representation of the 
Salvadoran and other Latino communities in the U.S., promote the economic 
development and democracy in El Salvador, as well as to advocate for its economic, 
educational, and political advancement and growth.”162 Additionally, according to Karla 
Cativo, the current Outreach and Organizing Manager of SALEF, SALEF was “created 
with the intention of opening up a space for the youth from Central America that was 
coming into the U.S. to have access to higher education, to going to college, to going to 
universities if that was what they wanted to do.”163 Therefore, by establishing SALEF, 
which was the first educational fund established in the Los Angeles region dedicated to 
creating those opportunities, SALEF was able to address a need that Vaquerano saw as 
missing, but necessary, whilst working for CARECEN in order to address the evolving 
needs of the Salvadoran-American community in Los Angeles during the 1990s. Over 
time, SALEF would grow to address many of the same areas as El Rescate, CARECEN, 
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and ASOSAL, like naturalization services and legal services, but would remain largely 
focused on the importance of youth education through their scholarship, youth 
employment, and community college course programs.  By partnering with a local 
community college, SALEF is able to “offer college courses revolving around the topic 
of Central American studies to local youth.”164 This college course program was 
established to address the problem that the “youth is very disconnected with the history of 
Central America, and what we [SALEF] are doing with these courses is opening that line 
of communication for them so that they can explore a little bit more where they come 
from because, at this point, a lot of local youth is born here and no longer coming straight 
from the country.”165 The purpose of the focus of these classes was, according to Cativo, 
was both to preserve the Salvadoran culture and identity within the disconnected youth 
generations born in the United States as well as to explain, through historical context 
dating back to the 19th and 20th centuries, “a little more background on why the countries 
are the way that they are and why there is so much immigration coming from those 
areas.”166 This shows that, like ASOSAL and the newer programs of El Rescate and 
CARECEN, the youth-specific focus in the 1990s was becoming increasingly important, 
as was the focus on programs that encouraged the Salvadoran community to maintain 
their unique transnational identity while still integrating their community as a whole into 
the multicultural identity of Los Angeles.  
Collaboration between the Los Angeles-based activist community organizations 
has been an important key in their ability to obtain a positive outcome from a variety of 
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projects. Cativo emphasized the role of collaboration with other activist community 
organizations focused on Salvadorans and Central Americans in the more recent 
successes of SALEF. She acknowledged that, during the 1980s when a majority of the 
original activist community organizations were founded by people arriving through the 
Salvadoran Diaspora, many of the founding activists came together to determine what 
types of organizations and programs were needed to address all of the various needs of 
the growing Salvadoran Los Angeles population. This collaborative inception of the 
Salvadoran and Central American-focused activist community organizations was vital in 
contributing to their initial success and the legacy and standard set by said success and, 
so, in order to continue this collaborative legacy, SALEF put an important emphasis on 
working together with other organizations for the ultimate well-being of the communities 
being served. This collaborative legacy, according to Cativo, allowed the comparatively 
new and small organization to make a lot of headway on a variety of projects. When 
asked how SALEF was able to provide so many various services successfully with a staff 
of only seven, Cativo answered “I know how it gets done – it’s because we have 
awesome, kickass community partners and we all stick together, and we are able to get 
things done together.”167 SALEF typically worked with El Rescate and CARECEN but 
has also collaborated on projects benefitting the community with a number of Los 
Angeles Catholic organizations. Additionally, in the near future, SALEF has the very real 
possibility of further expanding its transnational focus by establishing an office in San 
Salvador to continue SALEF’s focus on Salvadoran youth by through extending their 
youth services, scholarship fund, and history course programs into El Salvador. Cativo 
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stated that the purpose of expanding into El Salvador would also help address many of 
the same issues facing Salvadoran youth in Los Angeles, especially “in terms of 
understanding intergenerational trauma and connecting with historical memory, which 
are things that have almost been erased form the academic and consciousness of the 
Salvadoran youth.”168 Finally, an example that encompasses SALEF’s dedication to the 
Salvadoran transnational identity and historical memory in Los Angeles was the 2012 
installation of a statue commemorating Monsignor Oscar Romero in the center of the 
increasingly Salvadoran within MacArthur Park. The effort to get this statue installed in 
the public space of Los Angeles was extensive, and it took a fairly long time, but the 
effort was led by SALEF because of the importance of MacArthur Park as a key 
landmark for the Central American community of Los Angeles.169  
The third, and final, new activist community organization that emerged following 
the Peace Accords was Homies Unidos. Although initially founded in 1996 in San 
Salvador, Homies Unidos soon thereafter gained a Los Angeles-based office in 1997.  
The stated mission of Homies Unidos was to “end violence and promote peace in our 
Central American communities through gang prevention; the promotion of human rights 
in immigrant communities and the empowerment of youth and families in El Salvador 
and Los Angeles to achieve their full potential in a just, safe, and healthy society.”170 The 
foundation of Homies Unidos was largely in response to the proliferation of U.S.-based 
gangs, like Mara Salvatrucha 13 or MS-13, that began in Los Angeles and the subsequent 
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problems U.S. policy and deportation practices caused for the Salvadoran government 
and people following the transnationalization and spread of these gangs into Central 
America. However, Homies Unidos does not try to pull the gang members out of the 
gangs. Instead, Homies Unidos attempts to accomplish their mission by eliminating 
violence and providing gang members with training in nonviolence and conflict 
resolution as well as skills such as computer graphics and design. The Homies Unidos 
Los Angeles chapter was founded by Alex Sanchez as a way to provide an alternative to 
“gangs, drugs, and other negative activity”171 for the youth in the Pico Union 
neighborhood of Los Angeles, where gang membership was especially prevalent and 
common. Additionally, Homies Unidos worked to promote other educational 
opportunities for the Salvadoran youth in Los Angeles.  
Although Homies Unidos has a different overarching goal than many of the other 
activist community organizations in Los Angeles, they still serve generally the same 
communities and have had to adjust their approaches to programs and problems in similar 
manners to other activist community organizations. Additionally, Homies Unidos has 
also collaborated with many of the other aforementioned activist community 
organizations on larger projects related to topics such as legislative policy advocacy. For 
example, in 1997, “several gang members linked with the network traveled to El 
Salvador with a delegation arranged by CARECEN.” Upon this delegation’s return to 
Los Angeles, many noted that the “conditions in El Salvador were even worse than on the 
streets of Los Angeles, and the network has incorporated goals such as reducing the 
                                                          




deportation of gang members to El Salvador and other countries.”172 This sentiment was 
echoed by Alex Sanchez, as shown through his actions and focus on new programs, along 
with the other members of the Los Angeles-based chapter of Homies Unidos, such as 
negotiating with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to allow Homies 
Unidos to “distribute literature to gang members facing deportation with information on 
how to contact Homies when back in El Salvador,” as well as his cooperation with U.S. 
attorneys on “efforts to block gang deportations on the grounds that gang members (who 
have been targeted by death squads in El Salvador and other countries) face the danger of 
being killed on their return.”173 Elena Zilberg points out a depressing parallel in her 
article “Refugee Gang Youth: Zero Tolerance and the Security state in Contemporary 
U.S.-Salvadoran Relations,” stating that the “U.S. and El Salvador appear to be locked in 
a repeating history. Salvadorans were forced out of El Salvador as civil war refugees in 
the 1980s, only to be forced out of the United States in the 1990s as criminal deportees. 
Today, Salvadoran youth and young adults are fleeing El Salvador once again, this time 
as a result of the combined pressures of both gang and state violence.”174 It was under 
this sociopolitical context that MS-13 was created in Los Angeles and subsequently was 
what created the space and need for an organization founded in nonviolence like Homies 
Unidos. 
Negative Unintended Consequences 
 The formation of activist community organizations, a transnational Salvadoran 
identity, and growing Salvadoran-American community in Los Angeles were all 
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relatively “positive” unintended consequences resulting from the Salvadoran Diaspora. 
Even though these consequences are being referred to as “positive” in this context, by no 
means were any of the series of events sparked by the extremely violent Salvadoran Civil 
War and the subsequent fleeing from persecution and violence of Salvadorans to the 
United States as a part of the Salvadoran Diaspora positive. Rather, the ability of 
Salvadorans arriving in the United States, and specifically Los Angeles, to make the best 
out of a terrible situation through the formation of activist community organizations 
focused specifically on the Salvadorans who were arriving in Los Angeles and by 
establishing roots, livelihoods, and communities following fleeing persecution were, in 
this sense, a positive outcome compared to the much more negative point of view on the 
terrible series of events that led many Salvadorans to their new Los Angeles 
communities. Additionally, these “positive” unintended consequences of U.S. 
intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War and the subsequent ten year period of massive 
levels of violence, repression and human rights violations could also be considered 
positive in comparison to two very negative unintended consequences of the continued 
relationship between the United States and El Salvador in the 1990s: the creation of the 
gang MS-13 and the exportation of strict U.S. criminal policing legislation into El 
Salvador.175  
Following the end of the Cold War and the Salvadoran civil war, the pattern of 
state-sponsored political violence ended, but the underlying social, political, and 
economic inequalities and tensions remained. Both negative unintended consequences 
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can be viewed as a result of the switch in Salvadoran society following the end of the 
Civil War and the ratification of the final version of the Chapultepec Peace Accords from 
having to constantly endure the official state-sponsored political violence committed 
directly from the Salvadoran government and military to gang violence which is a more 
unofficial type of violence and persecution. This led to the transition from state-
sponsored political violence to the “new” dominant form of violence in the postwar 
period: gang violence. The rise of gang violence in El Salvador similarly most negatively 
impacted the marginalized urban youth demographic of El Salvador. However, unlike the 
political violence of the Civil War era, the violence was committed by gangs, which are 
non-state actors. 
Despite the official end of the Civil War and the resulting reduction of state-
sponsored political violence, the nation of El Salvador still experienced high levels of 
structural violence. It was in this context that the parallels between the violence in El 
Salvador in the 1980s and the 2000s-2010s were most apparent. This comparison is most 
effective by the continuation of the evaluation of elements of the Salvadoran civil war 
previously discussed with the “new” manifestations of violence in El Salvador, the 
changing roles and impacts of structural inequalities, the detrimental impact on 
Salvadoran youth, and the transformation of the role of the United States in driving the 
emergence of “new” gang violence in El Salvador. This “new” violence, although not 
perpetrated by state-sponsored actors like during the Civil War, still has traceable roots in 
the institutionalized structural causes of “rising social and economic inequality, poorly 
functioning systems of law and order, and the illicit criminal networks functioning in the 
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region.”176 This contemporary manifestation of violence was often attributed to the rise of 
youth street gangs, or maras, during the postwar period. The young members of these 
maras, like the revolutionaries that made up the FMLN, had a common feeling of social 
exclusion and marginalization that was rooted in the frustrations with social and 
economic hardship caused by the disruptive Salvadoran Civil War.177  
The inability of the Salvadoran state to address the historical problem of social 
inclusion is a vital contributing factor to this transformation from political violence to 
gang violence. Social exclusion, which is defined as “the process through which 
individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the 
society in which they live,” is a breeding ground for the increasing Salvadoran youth 
participation in gang violence.178 For Salvadoran youths experiencing social exclusion 
and marginalization, “belonging and otherwise unobtainable recognition” can be found in 
gang membership.179 
The most well-known, but also most commonly misunderstood, Salvadoran gang 
is MS-13. MS-13 was founded in Los Angeles during the 1980s and exported to El 
Salvador following the end of the Salvadoran civil war. With the exportation of MS-13 
into El Salvador, and its subsequent incorporation of the smaller, territorial domestic 
youth gangs, the former street gangs have become political actors in El Salvador. The 
politicization of MS-13 is shown through the social and political objectives of the gang 
that transcended the previous motivations of economic prosperity. In looking at the new 
                                                          
176 Kirsten Howarth and Jenny H. Peterson, Linking Political Violence and Crime in Latin America: Myths, 
Realities, and Complexities (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016): xvii.  
177 Abrego, “On Silences,” 74-80; Howarth and Peterson, Linking Political Violence and Crime in Latin 
America, xvii; Zilberg, “Refugee Gang Youth,” 61-69; Bruneau, Dammert, and Skinner, eds., Maras, 43-
69; Ward, Gangsters Without Borders, 48-55.  
178 Savenije and Borgh, “Youth Gangs,” 158-159.  
179 Savenije and Borgh, “Youth Gangs,” 167.  
  
110 
forms of power gained through the politicization of the gangs, it can be argued that the 
presence of the gangs in El Salvador, and the threat of violence against any opposition to 
the gangs, have allowed these third-generation gangs to take de facto control of the 
Salvadoran state. This de facto control of the Salvadoran state is further strengthened by 
the inability or unwillingness of legitimate Salvadoran state institutions to effectively 
combat the increasingly politicized, transnational gang organizations. Additionally, 
although MS-13 has become a transnational organization, this spread was largely 
unintentional and was a result, for the most part, of “the secondary migration of Central 
American families within the United States…and later as a result of the mass 
deportations of gang members back to their home countries in Central America.”180 
According to the eight-year immersive anthropological study of T.W. Ward, many of the 
Salvadoran youths arriving during the second Salvadoran Diaspora of the 1990s in Los 
Angeles chose to join a street gang in Los Angeles “partly as a product of their childhood 
socialization to violence and the traumas of war, partly as a result of his feelings of 
abandonment, resentment, and alienation, and partly as a response to this new form of 
oppression.”181 Therefore, because of the unsafe feelings caused by the Salvadoran Civil 
War’s unintended consequences, Salvadoran youth that desired a sense of belonging in 
Los Angeles were disproportionately more likely to join a street gang of peers with 
similar experiences, which is what MS-13 began as, in order to gain this sense of 
belonging and, later, protection. These somewhat nonviolent origins of MS-13 would 
quickly shift to a more violent and protection-oriented organization in order to stand up to 
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the other violent street gangs in Los Angeles, and this violence would be what ultimately 
led to a mass deportation and transnationalization of MS-13.182   
Once back in El Salvador, the recently deported gang members recruited 
Salvadoran youth from the already existing small-scale youth street gangs. Although 
Homies Unidos did help abate some of the violence coming into El Salvador from the 
U.S.-based gang members, the reach of the organization was ultimately not enough, and 
the transnational gang organization grew in power and violence. This increase in 
violence, as well as the need of the Salvadoran government to repatriate the returning 
Salvadoran citizens, led to the second large negative unintended consequence of an 
increasing preventatively harsh anti-gang and anti-crime legislation and policing strategy 
within El Salvador.  This anti-gang legislation in El Salvador manifested into the policy 
El Plan Mano Dura and, like U.S. anti-gang legislation, it works, under the guise of 
prevention, “to build a criminal record against youth through petty infractions and 
channels young people into the criminal justice system before serious crimes are 
committed.”183 El Plan Mano Dura, like the first negative unintended consequence, 
inordinately impacted Salvadoran youth while limiting the ability of Homies Unidos to 
actively work on the promotion of nonviolence in gangs in El Salvador.  
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While the flow of immigrants from El Salvador to the U.S. continues as a long 
continuum of failed Cold War and post-Cold War policies, contemporary immigrants 
face more obstacles to achieving legal status due to archaic language of what it means to 
be a “refugee” or “asylee.” The U.S. definition of refugee and asylee focuses on their 
being persecuted by state-sponsored actors. However, in most gang-related asylum 
claims, the persecution is from nonstate actors. In order for asylum in a gang-related 
claim to be granted, it “is often necessary to establish that the state is unwilling or unable 
to provide protection to these individuals.”184 The recent politicization of the gangs in El 
Salvador combined with the failure of the Salvadoran state in combatting the violence 
used by the gangs in El Salvador for youth recruitment and to gain social, political, and 
economic control is the main justification for the surge of asylum-seekers from El 
Salvador during the 1990s and 2000s. This led to, like during the Salvadoran Diaspora in 
the 1980s, the exclusion of Salvadoran migrants from evenly accessing asylum status that 
would allow them to more easily and safely enter the United States.  
Additionally, these negative unintended consequences founded in the ongoing, 
and increasingly complex and tense, U.S.-Salvadoran relationship inordinately impacted 
youth, both within El Salvador and in the United States. As previously mentioned, many 
of the new activist community organizations within Los Angeles attempted to somewhat 
combat these youth impacts through education and community building, however, this 
did not change much, especially for the youth involved in the gangs in the U.S., involved 
in the gangs in El Salvador, or attempting to flee membership in or persecution from the 
gangs in El Salvador by obtaining asylum in the United States.  
                                                          




History, Memory, and the Solidification of a Transnational Salvadoran Identity   
The official site of memory and remembrances of martyred Salvadoran 
Archbishop Oscar Romero have been especially important to the Salvadoran community 
in MacArthur Park as well as to the greater Los Angeles community. Romero, an 
exponent of liberation theology who advocated for the poor in El Salvador, was 
assassinated on March 24, 1980 while delivering morning mass. However, even though 
Romero’s assassination was unsolved under the official investigations, it was largely 
accepted and known by the Salvadoran general public that the assassination was 
committed by one of the right-wing, pseudo-military “death squads” under the orders of 
death squad leader Roberto D’Aubuisson because of the so-called “radical” messages 
Romero preached in his masses and radio addresses.185 
The official investigation of who, or which side of the Civil War, was responsible 
for the assassination of Romero in the United States, in the eyes of the international 
community, and under the Salvadoran state was an investigation that went unsolved for a 
number of years following his assassination and remained a topic of interest throughout, 
and following the ending, of the Salvadoran Civil War. This “unsolved” nature of the 
assassination of Oscar Romero, as well as his ongoing importance as a figure of 
martyrdom throughout the Salvadoran Civil War, is best illustrated through a series of 
documents compiled under a 1987 “Secretary’s Panel” under Secretary of State William 
L. Ball. Minnesota Senator Republican David Durenberger, who was apparently 
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advocating on behalf of a constituent, wrote the following: “I urge you to begin a 
thorough investigation into the brutal assassination of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar 
Romero. I do not believe that U.S. officials have a serious interest in finding those 
responsible for this atrocity!”186 This not only showed the still unresolved nature of 
Romero’s assassination, even in the eyes of the American public and government, seven 
years following his assassination, but also revealed how significant of a figure and martyr 
Romero was that recognition of his assassination by “death squads” was still a focus of 
individual citizens and those concerned with human rights violations. The rest of the 
documents within the compiled file span in dates of origins from 1987 to 1992 and 
contain a fairly wide-ranging and deep amount of information detailing the various 
official investigations into who was to be held accountable for Romero’s assassination, 
ultimately ending with a post-Truth Commission document in which these questions were 
finally officially resolved. It was here that the U.S. Secretary’s Panel recognized that:  
Monsignor Romero had become a well-known critic of violence and 
injustice, and as such, he was seen in right-wing civilian and military 
circles as a dangerous enemy. His homilies provoked profound irritation in 
these circles because they included accounts of incidents in which human 
rights were violated…Therefore, individuals of high rank in the 
government as well as the Armed Forces viewed the actions of the 
archbishop as aiding subversion.187  
 
These religious messages that were perceived as dangerous are exemplified 
through Romero’s January 14, 1979 speech in which he stated “God is the judge of all 
social systems. Neither the gospel nor the church can be monopolized by any political or 
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social movement.”188 In this quote, Romero was still seemingly attempting to keep 
church and state separate, however, by not providing approval for the repressive ARENA 
government, Romero was inherently challenging the power of the political party in 
charge and reasserting the power of both himself and the church as a leader in the eyes of 
the Salvadoran people. This religious leadership assuring the Salvadoran people that the 
Church will not be coopted by the repressive regime was important, even though Romero 
himself in the near future would move from implicitly political to more directly political 
in support of the rising revolutionary FMLN prior to his death and official martyrdom in 
the memory of the Salvadoran collective consciousness. The official politicization of 
Romero was especially apparent only about a year after his January 14, 1979 speech in 
his February 17, 1980 homily entitled “Poverty of the Beatitudes, Our Strength.” In this 
homily, Romero passionately stated that:  
promises continue to be made but action is lacking. What has become 
more evident this week is that neither the Junta nor the Christian 
Democrats are governing the country. They are only allowing that 
impression to be given nationally and internationally…and the bloody 
eviction of the occupants from the Christian Democrats’ headquarters 
show clearly that it is not they who govern, but rather the oppressive 
sector of the armed forces… They assassinated them: they assassinated 
various people in brutal manner…If the Junta and the Christian Democrats 
do not want to be seen as accomplices of so much abuse of power and 
accomplices of so many criminal acts, then they ought to single out and 
punish those responsible for these actions.189  
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Although the messages Romero was preaching throughout his public addresses to the 
Salvadoran people had contained “revolutionary” or incendiary undercurrents of which 
the death squads and the Salvadoran government would have seen as dangerous long 
prior to this speech, it was at this point that Romero became not only explicitly political, 
but a significant leader in the eyes of the repressed Salvadoran public and the FMLN.  
The right-wing, ARENA-led government and D’Aubuisson feared Romero’s 
messages would lend itself to the formation of more FMLN revolutionaries due to the 
power of liberation theology to appeal to the poor. Liberation theology is most closely 
associated with Latin American versions of Catholicism and is a synthesis of traditional 
Catholic theology and Marxist concepts founded in advocating for a belief in the 
salvation for the poor and oppressed members of society through their liberation from 
social, economic, and political oppression. A prime example of Romero’s dedication to 
this ideology was his September 23, 1979 public address in which he stated that “I will 
not tire of declaring that if we really want an effective end to violence, we must remove 
the violence that lies at the root of all violence: structural violence, social injustice, 
exclusion of citizens from the management of the country, repression.”190  
Romero’s work had deep historical roots in El Salvador, dating back to the desire 
for agrarian and land reforms that sparked the 1932 Matanza. In the late 1970s preceding 
Romero’s assassination, the dissatisfaction of the Salvadoran general public with the 
inequalities of Salvadoran economic, social, and political structures was growing. It was 
this dissatisfaction with the ongoing inequalities and oppressions of the poor that created 
the space for the FMLN to first launch a revolution against the Salvadoran government. 
                                                          




At the same time, it was the messages of Oscar Romero that were able to voice the 
discontent of the people while at the same time preaching a message of ultimate hope 
through the salvation from this oppression and inequality. This was a dangerous message 
in the eyes of the Salvadoran government, especially in the context of the other Cold 
War-era Central American revolutions that were ignited over similar issues.  
Immediately following Romero’s assassination, he became, in the eyes of the 
Salvadoran people, even if they had not previously been politicized or apart of one of the 
revolutionary organizations combined under the FMLN umbrella, a martyr representing 
the extreme violence and repression of the Salvadoran Civil War. The heroic status of the 
martyred Romero was maintained in the social memories of Salvadorans and, more 
widely, Central Americans from the time of the Civil War to the present. Additionally, 
Romero’s messages founded in liberation theology, specifically his focus on the poor and 
oppressed, continued to be highly applicable throughout the Salvadoran Civil War, the 
Salvadoran Diaspora, the period immediately following the Chapultepec Peace Accords, 
and through the 1990s and 2000s and into the present. Romero, although already widely 
recognized as a martyr, received sainthood status on October 14, 2018 by Pope Francis 
who, due to his Argentinian roots, was highly influenced by Oscar Romero. In Romero’s 
canonization, Pope Francis emphasized Romero’s “dedication to the poor and 
marginalized” and wore “the blood-stained rope belt Romero wore when he was gunned 
down.”191 Not only does the official recognition of Romero’s influence in El Salvador, 
and Latin America as a whole, but the physical wearing of Romero’s “blood-stained rope 
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belt” further linked the sociopolitical significance and martyrdom of Romero in the 
collective social memory of the transnational Salvadoran community.  
The memory and importance of Romero to the transnational Salvadoran, and 
Latin American, community as a whole also has gained more physical manifestations in 
recent years within Los Angeles. For example, under the leadership of SALEF and in 
conjunction with other community organizations and Los Angeles city officials, finally 
got approval for the installation of a statue honoring Oscar Romero in MacArthur Park on 
November 24, 2013. This was significant for the Salvadoran, and Latin American, 
community within the Pico Union neighborhood of Los Angeles because MacArthur Park 
is located right inside of this neighborhood and had, since the beginning of the 
Salvadoran Diaspora, served as a gathering place for Latin American people in the 
neighborhood in which soccer games were played, people participated in the informal 
economy by selling food and goods, and people held protests against the Civil War and 
the exclusionary immigration and deportation policies of the United States.192  
In an interview following the installation of the statue within MacArthur Park, 
Carlos Vaquerano, the founder and director of SALEF, stated that “Msgr. Romero is a 
legend for Salvadorans, and having the statue in Los Angeles, the second largest 
concentrations of Salvadorans, what more can we ask?”193 Vaquerano emphasized the 
importance of Romero in the memory of the Salvadoran transnational community by 
stating “he represents the struggle of many of us. He represents the beliefs and all those 
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ideas of social justice, and I think having him in L.A. just sends a powerful message for 
the future of our community.”194 The physical statue itself further emphasized the 
transnational connections between El Salvador and the “faraway” community within Los 
Angeles since the bronze likeness was “created in El Salvador by artist Joaquin Serrano 
and flown to Los Angeles.”195 This journey of the physical statue from El Salvador to the 
Pico Union neighborhood of Los Angeles in which a majority of the Salvadoran migrants 
arrived and settled was representative of the Salvadoran Diaspora through the fact that 
the statue, or source of memory, was created in El Salvador and then sent away to Los 
Angeles to be given a new transnational meaning. Additionally, although the statue was 
now a part of the Los Angeles community, like the creation of a uniquely Salvadoran-
American identity for the migrants arriving and settling in Los Angeles, the statue will 
always maintain a Salvadoran history and identity because of its origins in El Salvador.  
The impact of the statue itself within MacArthur Park is twofold. First, the 
placement of a statue of a martyr of the Salvadoran Civil War, in which the U.S. and 
Oscar Romero were supporting opposing sides, explicitly recognized the significance of 
the Salvadoran community to the Pico Union neighborhood. Secondly, it further 
legitimizes all of the arguments previously made by the activist community organizations 
in support of acknowledging the legal residency status of Salvadorans in the United 
States and the importance of Salvadorans specifically to the growth of MacArthur Park, 
and vice-versa. Finally, as acknowledged by then Los Angeles Councilman Ed Reyes that 
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represented the neighborhood surrounding MacArthur Park, the statue of Oscar Romero 
“will not only serve the Central American community, but it will offer Angelenos an 
insight into the rich history and culture of our diverse city.”196 This sentiment is 
representative of the importance of not just promoting the memory of Romero to the 
Central American community’s social memory, but also in furthering the knowledge and 
education of the rest of the Los Angeles community on the history and importance of the 
ever-growing transnational Salvadoran community in Los Angeles.197  
Overall, although all three of the activist community organizations that emerged 
in Los Angeles during the 1990s had fairly distinct and different focuses from one 
another, all three, in one way or another, focused on youth and education as a way to 
address the evolving needs of the Salvadoran-American community. The emergence of 
these organizations, as well as the continuation of El Rescate and CARECEN, allowed 
for a wider range of needs of the Salvadoran and Central American communities within 
Los Angeles to be addressed. Additionally, because all of these organizations focused on 
and were headquartered in and around the Pico Union/MacArthur Park neighborhood in 
which a majority of the community had arrived and settled in, it allowed for a greater 
legacy of collaboration between organizations in advocating on the behalf of the 
community in larger projects. Another positive outcome of the creation of the 
transnational Salvadoran community within MacArthur Park was the establishment of 
Salvadoran sites of culture and business that would contribute to the further development 
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and vibrancy of the community. As previously mentioned, the public space of MacArthur 
Park would ultimately recognize this established community by establishing a statue 
memorializing the Salvadoran martyr Oscar Romero, but this was not the only public 
manifestation of Salvadoran culture in the Pico Union neighborhood. Another park within 
the community was renamed “Oscar Romero Park” and, after years of petitioning, the 
City of Los Angeles officially renamed part of the community “Little El Salvador.” These 
are just two of the official manifestations of Salvadoran-American transnational identity 
in and positive influence on the City of Los Angeles as a whole. Salvadoran-Americans 
have also been able to find “new sites to anchor, cultivate, and restore their much ravaged 
memory and cultural knowledge” while at the same time promoting the growth of 
Salvadoran-founded and run businesses on a section of Vermont Avenue known as the 
“El Salvador Community Corridor.”198 The vitality of the Salvadoran-American 
community in Los Angeles really began to accelerate in the 1990s following the 
Salvadoran Peace Accords, despite the ongoing legal and political limitations to obtaining 
official legal residency status. This growth of the Salvadoran-American community 
throughout the 1990s allowed for the creation of a transnational Salvadoran identity and 
culture and was due, in a large part, to the evolution of the preexisting activist community 
organizations along with the needs of the community as well as the foundation of 
additional activist community organizations to address, in more depth, the growing 
focuses on youth, education, and the preservation of the collective social and historical 
memory of the Salvadoran Civil War and Salvadoran Diaspora that first began the 
creation of a Salvadoran community in Los Angeles. 
                                                          








How does an understanding of the evolving U.S. relationship with El Salvador 
and the resulting unintended consequences relate to the sociopolitical climate of today? 
How are the contemporary debates over immigration and foreign policy related to these 
historical moments? News coverage about the “northern triangle” countries of 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras that dominate news cycles in the era of the Trump 
presidency – a president whose campaign promise was to build a wall between the U.S. 
and Mexico—are rooted in the cycle of unintended consequences sparked by the U.S. 
intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War. Despite the history and identity of the U.S. as a 
“nation of immigrants,” the U.S., over the last 40 years, has moved toward an 
increasingly exclusionary national policy against Central American immigration. Much 
of this historic exclusion has come with a dehumanization and villainization of Central 
Americans by both the national government and the mass media and, although this is by 
no means a “new” product or sociopolitical reality, this misrepresentative caricature of 
Central Americans has drastically increased since the election of Donald Trump as the 
nation’s 44th President. His use of this strategy based in fearmongering and vague, 
factually inaccurate claims in such a short space would be impossible due to both the 
number of public statements or tweets Trump makes per day on average and the amount 
of mass media coverage on these claims, however, this plethora of information, or, 
perhaps more accurately, misinformation does make it easier to show how all of the 
arguments made over the past three chapters matter to developing a more complete 
understanding of the greater story on which Trump’s narrative is loosely based on.  
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Neither the villainization of Central American immigrants nor having hardline 
immigration policies is unique to the Trump administration. In fact, the Trump 
administration might be seen as following in the footsteps of Barack Obama’s 
administration on this issue – although both men are likely to hotly contest any such 
characterization. President Barack Obama was referred to as “Deporter in Chief” by his 
critics on immigration policy due to his administration’s ability to “forcefully expel more 
than 3 million people from U.S. territory.” However, the Trump administration has not 
only taken these anti-immigrant and deportation policies to an entirely new level than the 
previous administration but has also managed to “strike down” the minor protections the 
Obama administration conceded, like Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) – 
a  renewable suspension of deportation for undocumented immigrants who arrived in the 
U.S. at the age of two or younger – and TPS protection for Salvadorans, that had been a 
major point of success for the advocacy of Central American-focused activist community 
organizations.199  
El Salvador specifically has been the disproportionate focus of Trump’s anti-
immigrant stance and have faced mass deportations as well as “dehumanizing depictions 
of scowling, tattooed MS-13 gang members to stigmatize immigrants and justify 
escalating enforcement.” As previously argued, this depiction is emblematic of the 
ongoing problem with the mass media and U.S. government’s focus on the small portion 
of the unintended consequences that were negative compared with the overwhelmingly 
larger and more significant “positive” unintended consequences. This disproportionate 
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focus, the almost constant anti-immigrant and anti-Central America-founded xenophobic 
and nativist rhetoric of Trump, his supporters, and the conservative media, and the lack of 
adequate education in American schools on the role the United States played in the 
violence of the Salvadoran Civil War has contributed to the misinformation surrounding 
many of the contemporary debates surrounding topics related to immigration from 
Central America and foreign policy. Therefore, by providing a more complete historical 
background to these debates and emphasizing the “positive” unintended consequences, as 
opposed to just the negative unintended consequences, this thesis makes a valuable 
contribution to the overall understanding of a variety of topics, including the U.S. 
interference in El Salvador, the Salvadoran Diaspora, and the role of activist community 
organizations in establishing a transnational Salvadoran-American community in Los 
Angeles.  
Additionally, through this emphasis on the positive, this thesis confirms, and adds 
to, Doug Saunders’s argument made in Arrival City: How the Largest Migration in 
History is Reshaping Our World that the presence of migrants in “arrival cities” or urban 
centers, like Los Angeles, is beneficial to the urban center as a whole and representative 
of humanity at its best. The Los Angeles-based Salvadoran migrant community is a prime 
example of the rural-to-urban migration on which Saunders’s arguments are based. 
Furthermore, the positive impact made by Salvadoran-focused and founded activist 
community organizations on Los Angeles as a whole echoed his optimistic view of global 
urbanization in which migrant communities in arrival cities play a vital role. Therefore, 
the focus on activist community organizations and positive unintended consequences of 
the Salvadoran Diaspora is an important contribution to the small, yet growing, 
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historiography on a more positive view of arrival cities and the necessary inclusion of 
immigrants into the legal, social, and political structures of a city.200  
Despite the end of the Cold War, as well as a number of ultimately unsuccessful 
attempts at reform, the violence facing the Salvadoran youth remained founded in the 
inequalities that existed prior to the Salvadoran Civil War. Since long before the 
Salvadoran Civil War, the marginalized individuals of El Salvador have been fighting 
against economic, social, and political inequality and repression. This fight began largely 
under Salvadoran youth and revolutionary groups because the political system, and the 
past attempts at governmental reform, had failed them. Decades after the end of the 
Salvadoran Civil War, it is still the transnational community of Salvadoran youths that 
are most detrimentally impacted by the failure of the Salvadoran state to protect them 
from inequality, repression, and violence. The main changes from the period of the 
Salvadoran Civil War to the postwar period of the 2000s-2010s was not represented, as 
the revolutionaries intended, by reforms within El Salvador targeting the structural causes 
of inequality and marginalization. Instead, the major change from the Salvador Civil War 
to the postwar period was represented by the switch from state-sanctioned political 
violence and persecution to gang violence that the state has proven to be ineffective at 
combatting.  
Therefore, the question of Salvadoran asylum, immigration, and ongoing and 
deeply interconnected relationship between El Salvador in the context of today’s political 
climate is complicated. This complex issue regarding both U.S. immigration policy and 
U.S. foreign policy has historical roots that are best explored through the analysis of the 
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Cold War-era United States intervention in the Salvadoran Civil War, the sociopolitical 
impacts this had upon El Salvador, and the transition from the Cold War instability and 
political violence to the modern versions of violence that El Salvador faces today. 
Additionally, by looking more specifically into the narrower impact these inequalities and 
violence have on the Salvadoran youth, as well as on the growth of activist community 
organizations, both the unintended and direct consequences of the Salvadoran Civil War 
and the post-Peace Accords period are extra apparent. The debate between policymakers 
surrounding how to best approach a potential solution to ending violence in El Salvador 
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